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CULTURE CLASH: SPECIAL EDUCATION IN
CHARTER SCHOOLS*
ROBERT A. GARDA, JR.**
Charter schools and special education for disabled students are
based on conflicting education reforms and agency oversight
principles. Charter schools operate in a culture of regulatory
freedom and flexibility. They arose out of the modern era of
accountability reform, in which student outcomes are the
primary measure of school success and the driving engine of
agency oversight. In stark contrast, special education laws were
conceived in the civil rights era of education reform, which
emphasized process and paid little attention to outcomes. The
education of disabled students is steeped in a culture of
regulatory oversight focused on rigid compliance with complex
procedures. Special education and charter schools stand on
competing foundations in the same schoolhouse. The Article
discusses this culture clash and the consequences to disabled
students. The uncomfortable fit between charter schools and
special education often leads to violations of disabled students'
civil rights. The Article suggests how the three primary sources of
law affecting charter schools-federal law, state law, and charter
agreements-should be changed to achieve a seamless fit of
charter schools' square peg into special education's round hole
for the benefit of disabled students.
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INTRODUCTION
Blanca Diaz tensely sits in the school gymnasium with her three
grandsons waiting to hear the outcome of the lottery. Not the state
lottery for monetary riches, but a much more important one to
determine the educational fate of the three boys: the charter school
lottery. It is the type of life-altering moment documented in the
controversial film Waiting for "Superman,"' and Blanca Diaz is a
joyous winner on this day, securing a spot for her grandsons in the
Seven Hills Charter School. But the elation is later crushed when
1. WAITING FOR "SUPERMAN" (Electric Kinney Films, Participant Media & Walden
Media 2010).
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Seven Hills refuses to enroll two of the boys because they are
disabled. The lottery winners become lottery losers simply because of
their disabilities. This story of dashed hopes repeats itself across the
country for many disabled children.2 Parents are told that the charter
school to which they just won precious admission either will not, or
cannot, properly serve their children. This is but one example of how
charter schools violate federal statutes protecting the rights of
disabled students. This Article discusses how, and why, charter
schools often do not properly admit or serve disabled students, and
what changes should be made to state and federal law to solve the
problem.
Charter schools are the "kudzu of school choice" and their
spread is inevitable.3 More than two million public school students
attend the over 5,000 public charter schools in forty states and the
District of Columbia,4 but these figures understate the impact of
charter schools. In eighteen school districts, charter schools serve
more than 20% of students, and in nearly 100 school districts they
educate more than 10%.' Furthermore, the number of students
enrolled in charter schools is growing exponentially, more than
tripling in the last decade.6 The number of charter schools will
2. This story is based on personal accounts in Nancy J. Zollers & Arun K.
Ramanathan, For-Profit Charter Schools and Students with Disabilities: The Sordid Side of
the Business of Schooling, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 297, 299 (1998). Similar stories abound
around the country. See, e.g., S. POVERTY LAW CTR., ACCESS DENIED: NEW ORLEANS
STUDENTS AND PARENTS IDENTIFY BARRIERS TO PUBLIC EDUCATION 10-13 (2010),
available at http:/lwww.splcenter.org/sites/defaultlfiles/downloadslpublicationlSPLC
_reportAccessDenied.pdf.
3. James E. Ryan, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043,
2074 (2002); see CrR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, STANFORD UNIV.,
MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 6, 9 (2009)
[hereinafter CREDO STUDY].
4. Christine Armario, Number of Students Attending Charter Schools Soars,
BOSTON.COM (Dec. 7, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-12-07/news/30486920 1
_public-charter-schools-lynn-norman-teck-florida-consortium; The Public Charter Schools
Dashboard-Schools Overview, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www
.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview/year/2011 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012)
[hereinafter National Schools Overview].
5. NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., A GROWING MOVEMENT:
AMERICA'S LARGEST CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITIES 1 (6th ed. 2011), available at
http://www.publiccharters.org/data/files/Publicationdocs/2011 %20NAPCS%20Market%2
OShare%20Report 20111013T104601.pdf. Charter schools are becoming the "new
normal" in urban school districts, such as Detroit, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Chicago.
Mary Ann Zehr, New Urban Playbook: Hand Over Schools to Charter Operators, EDUC.
WK. (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/O3/21/26detroit.h30.html?tkn
=SSXFAT%2FPAdH47bWdKCrluVzZqnMgo87K6k%2B&intc=es.
6. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NCES 2011-033, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2011, at 24 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs20ll
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continue to increase because they enjoy bipartisan support on the
state and federal level;7 are backed by powerful business interests,
charitable foundations, and heavyweights in education leadership
positions;8 are supported by federal grants and institutionalized by
federal legislation, including President Obama's recent Race to the
Top Fund;9 and are increasingly demanded by parents."0 There is, in
/2011033.pdf. Between 1999 and 2009, the number of charter schools, and the number of
students they served, more than tripled. Id.; see National Schools Overview, supra note 4.
7. Nina Gupta, Rationality & Results: Why School Choice Efforts Endure Despite a
Lack of Improvement on Student Achievement, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 199,206-07 (2010); see
PAUL E. PETERSON, SAVING SCHOOLS: FROM HORACE MANN TO VIRTUAL LEARNING
215 (2010) (noting that bipartisan support for charter schools contributed significantly to
the rapid advancement of charter legislation on the state and national level); Thomas
Hehir, Charters: Students with Disabilities Need Not Apply?, EDUC. WK., Jan. 27, 2010, at
18 (noting bipartisan support for increasing charter school numbers).
8. See, e.g., Nancy Hass, Scholarly Investments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at ST1
(calling charter schools a "hot cause" for New York hedge fund managers); Joel Klein et
al., Editorial, How To Fix Our Schools: A Manifesto, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2010, at B1
(arguing that educators, superintendents, chief executives, and chancellors "must make
charter schools a truly viable option"). But see James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools
Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for
Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 869-73 (arguing that charter schools' reliance on
private funding makes them financially vulnerable).
9. The federal government granted more than $250 million to charter schools in
fiscal year 2011 and proposed increasing that number in 2012 pursuant to the Charter
School Program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7221-7223j (2006). Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., U.S.
Department of Education Awards Nearly $5 Million in Charter School Grants for
Planning, Program Design, Implementation and Dissemination (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-awards-nearly-5-million-
charter-school-grants-planning-p. Charter schools are institutionalized by the No Child
Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(A)-(B)(i) (2006), which permits failing
conventional schools to restructure themselves as charter schools; see also Margaret J.
McLaughlin & Lauren Morando Rhim, Accountability Frameworks and Children with
Disabilities: A Test of Assumptions About Improving Public Education for All Students, 54
INT'L J. DISABILITY, DEV. & EDuC. 25, 28 (2007) (claiming charter schools will likely
grow because they are institutionalized by No Child Left Behind ("NCLB")).
The Race to the Top Fund, established under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, listed as one criteria for aid receipt, the extent to which a given
state's laws do "not prohibit or effectively inhibit increasing the number of charter schools
... or otherwise restrict student enrollment in charter schools." Race to the Top Fund, 74
Fed. Reg. 37,804, 37,804, 37,809 (July 29, 2009); see also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., NCEE
2010-4029, THE EVALUATION OF CHARTER SCHOOL IMPACTS: FINAL REPORT 1 (2010)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT], available at http://ies.ed.gov/ncee
/pubs/20104029/pdf/20104029.pdf (noting that charter schools are poised for "another
period of significant growth" because of the Race to the Top Fund); Race to the Top Fund,
U.S. DEP'T EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2012) (providing an overview and proposed priorities of the program).
10. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S CHARTER
SCHOOLS 9 (Jeanne Allen & Alison Consoletti eds., 2010).
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short, a "perfect storm of political and economic circumstance leading
to a new era in charter school policy."11
The proliferation of charter schools suggests that they are
superior to traditional public schools, but debate rages on that issue.'2
One thing is certain-charter schools struggle to enroll and
appropriately serve students with disabilities such as mental
retardation; serious emotional disturbance; autism; specific learning
disabilities; and hearing, speech, language, or orthopedic or visual
impairments. 3 The harm to disabled students is obvious: they are
denied equal educational choices and opportunities in violation of
their civil rights. The harm to the charter movement is more subtle.
Chester Finn, a staunch charter advocate, predicted early in the
movement that "special education may turn out to be the most
dangerous land-mine buried on the charter school's property."' 4 This
premonition is proving to be correct. Charter schools' violation of
disabled students' civil rights undermines their viability as a
widespread alternative to traditional schools. Charter schools'
treatment of disabled students has been overlooked for far too long.
11. CREDO STUDY, supra note 3, at 9.
12. See BRIAN GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND
WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 105 (RAND
Corp. 2d ed. 2007) (concluding that charter school achievement results are mixed); DIANE
RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 138-44
(2010) (giving a concise summary of studies regarding charter school efficacy); U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 3, 75-77 (summarizing research regarding
charter schools' effect on student achievement); see, e.g., THE CENTURY FOUND.,
CHARTER SCHOOLS THAT WORK: ECONOMICALLY INTEGRATED SCHOOLS WITH
TEACHER VOICE 2-8 (2010) ("[T]he general performance of charter schools nationally
has been largely disappointing.").
13. See infra Part 1I. This Article uses the legal definitions of "child with a disability"
from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)
(2006), and "an individual with a disability" from section 705 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2006). See Robert J. Martin, Charter School Accessibility for
Historically Disadvantaged Students: The Experience in New Jersey, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
327, 368 (2004) (noting the implication that some charter schools fail to meet federal
disability law requirements); Timothy E. Morse, New Orleans's Unique School Reform
and Its Potential Implications for Special Education, 42 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 168, 172
(2010) (stating that charter schools struggle with addressing the needs of students
protected by IDEA); Lan Hue Quach, A Paradox of Care: [Re]-Examining Education for
Students with Diverse Needs, 19 EDUC. FOUND. 67, 69 (2005) (noting that charter schools
often fail to meet disabled children's needs); Sarah Carr, Charter Schools Struggle To Meet
Special Education Needs, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (Jan. 5, 2008), http://www
.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/01/charterschoolsstruggle tome.html (noting that New
Orleans's charter schools serve "significantly fewer" disabled students than their
traditional counterparts).
14. Joseph R. McKinney, Charter Schools' Legal Responsibilities Toward Children
with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP. 565, 576 (1998).
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Solutions must be considered during the impending reauthorizations
of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA") 5 and
the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB"). 16
Part I of this Article describes how the cultures of special
education and charter schools are different "[a]t their core."' 7 The
charter movement is rooted in the exchange of autonomy and
independence for educational results. Regulators judge charter
schools by the performance of their students, not adherence to
mandatory processes. As famously stated by President Clinton, they
are "schools that have no rules."' 8 But charter schools must comply
with the laws governing disabled students-IDEA, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 19 These
civil-rights era laws emphasize strict adherence to intricate
procedures more than educational results and presume the existence
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1400. "[IDEA is] scheduled to be reauthorized in 2011, [but] could be
delayed until 2013 or later." NAT'L SCH. BDS. ASS'N, ISSUE BRIEF: INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): EARLY PREPARATION FOR
REAUTHORIZATION 12 (2011), available at http://www.nsba.org/Advocacy/Key-Issues
/SpecialEducation/NSBA-Issue-Brief-Individuals-with-Disabilities-Education-Act-IDEA
.pdf.
16. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). Charter schools' treatment of disabled
students dominated committee discussion regarding legislation rewriting NCLB. Sam
Dillon, As U.S. Aid Grows, Oversight Is Urged for Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2010, at A16.
17. The All Students Achieving Through Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4330
Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 111th Cong. 27-30 (2010) (statement of Eileen
Ahearn, Director, Nat'l Ass'n of State Dirs. of Special Educ.) [hereinafter Ahearn
Testimony], available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg54829/pdf
/CHRG-111hhrg54829.pdf; see also TERRY L. JACKSON, PROJECT FORUM, NAT'L ASS'N
OF STATE DIRS. OF SPECIAL EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOLS: RESEARCH ON SPECIAL
EDUCATION 15 (2003) (noting "policy tension between charter schools and special
education"); Rebekah Gleason, Charter Schools and Special Education: Part of the
Solution or Part of the Problem?, 9 D.C. L. REV. 145, 146 (2007) (noting "inherent[]
conflict" between special education and charter schools); Margaret J. McLaughlin,
Evolving Interpretations of Educational Equity and Students with Disabilities, 76
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 265, 265 (2010) (identifying tension between special education and
standards-driven reform); McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 38-42 (identifying
"inherent tension[]"); Morse, supra note 13, at 171 (stating that the IDEA is "[c]ounter
to" the autonomy granted to charter schools).
18. October 6, 1996: The First Clinton-Dole Presidential Debate, COMM'N ON
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (Oct. 6, 1996), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
6-1996-debate-transcript.
19. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). For discussion of the
applicability of these statutes to charter schools in general, see Jay P. Heubert, Schools
Without Rules? Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law, and the Paradoxes of
Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303, 315, 343-45 (1997); Martin, supra
note 13, at 345.
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of a large and established bureaucracy overseeing numerous schools
working collectively. These foundations contrast starkly with the
fundamental nature and culture of charter schools and pit regulation
against autonomy, procedures against results, rigid bureaucracy
against flexibility, and collective action against independence-all in
the same school house.
Part II explains how this clash of cultures results in charter
schools constantly struggling to properly serve disabled students,
often in violation of their civil rights. The clash manifests itself by
charter schools failing to enroll disabled students, particularly
severely disabled students. It also results in charter schools failing to
fulfill basic federally mandated obligations such as identifying and
evaluating all disabled students and educating them in the least
restrictive environment. While not all charter schools are guilty of
these civil rights violations, and not all traditional schools are
innocent, the inherent tension between special education law and
charter schools makes compliance challenging.2"
The competing principles of special education and charter
schools-and the resulting problems-raise fundamental questions
about both the charter movement and special education law. Should
the law change to force charter schools to adapt to the culture of
special education or should special education adapt to the
accountability principles embodied in charter schools? The answer is
probably a little of both. In the long run, disability law can and should
adopt the accountability principles that have dominated education
reform over the last two decades. But in the short term, the autonomy
of charter schools should yield to the prescriptive nature of special
education. Part III discusses how federal law, state law, and charter
agreements should be changed to better ensure that charter schools
properly serve disabled students. IDEA should be amended to
prohibit charter schools from being independent local educational
agencies for purposes of special education. State law should demand
that charters become part of educational service agencies, made up
20. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW
ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 39
(2002), available at http://www2.ed.gov/inits/commissionsboards/whspecialeducation
/reports/images/PresRep.pdf (commenting that in order for charter schools to meet the
needs of students with disabilities, states need to provide equitable access to special
education funding). But see Lauren Morando Rhim, Eileen M. Ahearn & Cheryl M.
Lange, Charter School Statutes and Special Education: Policy Answers or Policy
Ambiguity?, 41 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 50, 51 (2007) (arguing that the core differences between
charter schools and special education regulations could give rise to a "harmonious
merger").
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exclusively of charter schools, for the provision of special education.
State law should also require charter applicants to develop detailed
plans and budgets for special education provisions and should also
remove enrollment decisions from charter operators. Finally, charter
authorizers should execute charter agreements with concrete goals for
disabled students, more rigorously review charter school compliance
with laws protecting disabled students, and punish schools for
violations. These changes re-align the culture of charter schools with
special education for the benefit of disabled students.
I. THE CULTURE CLASH BETWEEN CHARTER SCHOOLS & SPECIAL
EDUCATION
A. The Charter School Culture
Charter schools were conceived in the early stages of the
accountability era of education reform. In the 1980s, education
reform shifted from focusing on inputs, such as procedural
compliance and racial compositions, to outcomes, such as graduation
rates and student performance on standardized tests.2 The movement
was founded on the idea that schools would improve if they were held
accountable either through sanctions if their students failed to meet
educational benchmarks or from market pressures exerted by parents
choosing schools. Charter schools advance both the market and
standards-based accountability ideals.
Charter schools are public schools that operate with freedom
from many of the local and state regulations that apply to traditional
public schools. They exist by charter, or contract, with authorizers
such as school districts, state school boards, or universities. The
charter authorizers monitor charter school quality and hold schools
accountable for fiscal practices and the academic results promised in
the charter.22 Charters are also schools of choice, meaning no student
21. Heubert, supra note 19, at 303 n.10; McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 26-28;
see Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal to
Separate and Unequal, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 22-32 (2007) (chronicling the
rise of the school choice and accountability movement). For a discussion of the general
move in government from a focus on procedures to an emphasis on outcomes and how it
impacted education reform, see Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, The End of Government as We
Know It, in MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND
DOWNSIDE 227, 251 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002); ROBIN J. LAKE &
PAUL T. HILL, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN
PORTFOLIO SCHOOL DISTRICTS 12-16 (2009).
22. There are numerous definitions of "charter schools" because of significant
variations among the states. For general definitions, see 20 U.S.C. § 7221i(1) (2006)
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is compelled to attend. The basic principles of charter schools-
autonomy, accountability, and choice-perfectly matched the goals of
the accountability movement.
1. Autonomy & Independence
The foundation of the charter movement is autonomy and
independence: freedom from rules and regulations that govern
traditional schools.23 The national mood at the time charters arose
was that government and bureaucracy were part of the problem with
education, and that schools needed to be deregulated to act more like
businesses. 4 Albert Shanker, an early proponent of charter schools,
argued that they needed to be "totally autonomous" 25 to decide
budget, hiring, and curriculum. Chester Finn also noted early in the
charter movement that the best charter schools "have near total
independence to decide what to teach and how to teach it, whom to
hire and how to use their resources, what hours to operate and how
best to meet students' needs. ' 26 This freedom from regulation, it was
urged, would provide the flexibility that is necessary for school
innovation and improvement. 27
(defining charter schools for purposes of eligibility for federal grants); About Charter
Schools, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org
/about-charter-schools.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012); Issues, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM,
http://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/facts/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012);
School Choices for Parents, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/parents/schools/choice
/definitions.html (last modified Jan. 14, 2009).
23. EILEEN M. AHEARN ET AL., PROJECT SEARCH, NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE DIRS.
OF SPECIAL EDUC., SPECIAL EDUCATION AS REQUIREMENTS IN CHARTER SCHOOLS:
FINAL REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY 4 (2001), available at http://www.nasdse.org
/Portals/0/Documents/ProjectSearch.pdf (stating that charter schools are grounded in the
proposition that deregulation can improve public education); Lauren Morando Rhim &
Margaret McLaughlin, Students with Disabilities in Charter Schools: What We Now Know,
FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD., Jan. 2007, at 1, 2 ("The core principles underlying
charter schools are autonomy and choice.").
24. LARRY CUBAN, THE BLACKBOARD AND THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY SCHOOLS
CAN'T BE BUSINESSES 142 (2004); Forman, Jr., supra note 8, at 843, 848, 851.
25. DANA BRINSON & JACOB ROSCH, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., CHARTER
SCHOOL AUTONOMY: A HALF-BROKEN PROMISE 6 (2010), available at http://www
.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/201004-CharterAutonomyReport.pdf.
26. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Op-Ed., Beating Up on Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
1996, at 23.
27. See Heubert, supra note 19, at 307 n.25 (noting that most state charter statutes cite
promoting innovation through deregulation as a goal of charter schools). For examples of
state statutes that specifically mention flexibility and innovation as legislative purposes for
creating charter schools, see, for example, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(1) (West 2006); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(6)(i) (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302B-1 (LexisNexis
2010); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(a)(2) (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-2-
1(4) (LexisNexis 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-3 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT.
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The importance of autonomy to charter schools is evident in
state and federal statutes. State charter enabling statutes typically
mention the principle of autonomy or independence for charter
schools2" and grant them significant freedom from state and local laws
and regulations.29 The Federal Charter School Program grants money
to states to develop charter schools, but the statute gives priority to
states if state legislation provides charter schools autonomy over their
finances and expenditures.3 °
Despite the autonomy granted by statute, charter advocates
vociferously push for even more independence. Advocates grade
state charter enabling statutes based in large part on the amount of
freedom charter schools have from state and local regulation3 and
criticize any legislation that decreases school autonomy.32 Charter
§ 338.015 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-30(A) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-
102(b) (2009).
28. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-102(6) (2007); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601;
COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-301(2) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-66aa(1)(D)
(West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 501, 503 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5202
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3972(A) (2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.400(1) (West
2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:36A-3(a) (West 1999); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2850(2), 2853(c) (McKinney 2009); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29A (2011); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 17-1702-A (West 2006); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3-301 (2011); see also Denver Bd. v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639, 650 (Colo.
1999) ("The General Assembly intended the Charter Schools Act to create opportunities
for innovation, autonomy, and reform in public schools."); Cnty. of Haw. v. ALA Loop
Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103, 1159 (Haw. 2010) (holding that charter enabling legislation
was designed to provide charter schools with autonomy); Abbott v. Burke Implementing
Regulations, 792 A.2d 412, 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that the Charter
School Act codified the goal of autonomy).
29. For typical statutes exempting charter schools from state law, local regulations,
and school board policies, see ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.255 (a)(1) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-183(E)(5) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-103(2) (2003); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 47610; COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(6); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302B-9; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17:3996; UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-la-511 (LexisNexis 2009).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 7221a(e)(1)-(3) (2006).
31. See, e.g., THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE
STATES: RANKINGS AND SCORECARD 7 (Alison Consoletti ed., 12th ed. 2011); Measuring
Up to the Model: A Tool for Comparing State Charter School Laws, NAT'L ALLIANCE FOR
PUB. CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/charterlaws (last visited Feb. 22,
2012).
32. See Chester E. Finn & Amber M. Winkler, Foreward to BRINSON & ROSCH, supra
note 25, at 4-5; see also SARAH MEAD & ANDREW J. ROTHERHAM, EDUC. SECTOR, A
SUM GREATER THAN THE PARTS: WHAT STATES CAN TEACH EACH OTHER ABOUT
CHARTER SCHOOLING 7-9, 17-18 (2007) ("[I]t is also clear that the autonomy/freedom
side of the charter school bargain is not being realized in many states."); Kara S. Finnigan,
Charter School Autonomy: The Mismatch Between Theory and Practice, 21 EDUC. POL'Y
503, 523 (2007) (examining the degree of autonomy charter schools hold and the factors
limiting their autonomy); Jeanne Allen, Commentary, Charter Laws and Flawed Research,
EDUC. WK. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/09/08/03allen.h29.html
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schools often resort to the courts to maintain their autonomy from
state control over curriculum, budgeting, and hiring practices.
33
The autonomy ideal extends so far that in many states individual
charter schools are considered their own free-standing school
districts, or in technical jargon, local educational agencies ("LEAs").
LEAs, typically school districts overseeing numerous schools, are the
primary government unit responsible for education in state and
federal law. It is the LEA, not individual schools within the LEA, that
bears final responsibility for compliance with most state and federal
laws. The charter schools that are their own one-school LEAs, or
what I will refer to as independent charter schools, are treated the
same under state and federal law as school districts that usually
contain numerous schools.34 LEA status for a charter school is the
ultimate in autonomy-it elevates an individual charter school to the
same level of independence as an entire school district and entitles
them to the same state and federal funding streams. More than half of
the states that authorize charter schools allow them to exist as
independent LEAs. Only sixteen states require that charter schools
be part of an existing LEA, similar to the way traditional schools are
part of a school district.35
The number of independent charters-schools that are LEAs-
has dramatically increased the number of LEAs in the United States.
In the 2000-2001 school year, there were 13,681 LEAs, almost all of
which were traditional school districts.36 By the 2009-2010 school
?qs=charter+laws+and+flawed+research&intc=es ("Political compromises have given us
instead a panoply of laws that yield varying results, not the lack of state and regulatory
oversight that's needed.").
33. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 1-2, Basis Sch., Inc. v. Home, No. CV2007-
0011100 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2007), 2007 WL 4176583 (challenging the applicability of
state curriculum standards to charter schools); N.Y. Charter Schs. Ass'n v. DiNapoli, 857
N.Y.S.2d 450, 459 n.4 (App. Div. 2008) (challenging the constitutionality of state audits
that impacted the autonomy of charter schools).
34. See, e.g., Ariz. State Bd. for Charter Schs. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003,
1009-10 (9th Cir. 2006); Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist., 144 F.3d 574, 578-79 (8th
Cir. 1998); Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Smith, 561 F. Supp. 2d 74, 75-76
(D.D.C. 2008).
35. See State Matrix, PRIMERS ON IMPLEMENTING SPECIAL EDUC. CHARTER SCHS.,
http://www.edgateway.net/cs/spedp/query/q/2057 (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). Twenty-two
states and the District of Columbia permit charters to form as LEAs. Id.; see also Rhim et
al., supra note 20, at 56 (describing the legal status of charter schools in forty-one states).
36. BETH SINCLAIR, STATE ESEA TITLE I PARTICIPATION INFORMATION FOR
2000-2001: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT 14 (2004).
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year, the number of LEAs swelled to 17,807, with virtually all of the
growth coming from an increase in independent charter schools.37
2. Outcome Accountability
The autonomy charter schools receive is given in exchange for
accountability.38 The deal struck between charter schools and their
authorizers is simple: charter schools are freed from rules and
regulations, but only if they improve student academic outcomes,
typically determined by a combination of student performance on
standardized tests and graduation rates.39 If the measurable
educational benchmarks identified in the charter agreement are not
met, the charter is either revoked during the charter term or not
renewed at its end, and the school must close.4" This outcome
accountability combined with a "schools without rules" mentality puts
the emphasis in charter schools almost exclusively on the educational
outcomes of students instead of adherence to procedures and
regulations,4' which is the point of the accountability movement.
37. PATRICK KEATON, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NUMBERS AND TYPES
OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY LOCAL EDUCATION AGENCIES FROM THE
COMMON CORE OF DATA, SCHOOL YEAR 2009-10, at 7 (2011). The number of traditional
school districts has declined over the past decade. PETERSON, supra note 7, at 274.
38. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-2-1(4) (LexisNexis 2005) (describing that
charter schools are designed to allow "freedom and flexibility in exchange for exceptional
levels of accountability"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(a) (2001) ("The key appeal of the
charter school concept is its promise of increased accountability for student achievement
in exchange for increased school autonomy."); BRINSON & ROSCH, supra note 25, at 7, 9;
PAUL T. O'NEILL & TODD ZIEBARTH, CHARTER SCHOOL LAW DESKBOOK 5 (2009).
39. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3992(a)(2) (2001); MD. STATE BD. OF EDUC.,
MARYLAND CHARTER SCHOOLS: CHARTERING A COURSE TOWARDS EXCELLENCE,
MODEL PERFORMANCE CONTRACT 45-69 (2009), available at http://www.msde.maryland
.gov/NR/rdonlyres/15D2BCE6-9869-43B6-8E4F-D37A7FFCBC5F/22113/Model-Contract
082809.pdf; NAT'L ASS'N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS (NACSA), PRINCIPLES &
STANDARDS FOR QUALITY CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING 15, 21 (2010), available at
http://www.qualitycharters.org/images/stories/publications/Principles and Standards_2010
.pdf; Charter School Contract: Exhibit I-Framework for the Evaluation of Louisiana
Charter Schools 3, in Charter School Contract for Type 5 Charter Schools in the Louisiana
Recovery School District (2007), available at http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content
/uploads/2010/05/AbramsonWeb.pdf.
40. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-105(a)(4) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 302A-1186, 302B-14 (LexisNexis 2010); O'NEILL & ZIEBARTH, supra note 38, at 5
(explaining revocation and nonrenewal procedures).
41. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-102(6); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601(f) (West
2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-102(2)(h) (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(2)(a)(2)
(West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5202(7) (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-
2(8) (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-2-1(4); IOWA CODE ANN. § 256F.1(3)(e) (West
2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 89(d)(6) (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 124D.10(a)(5) (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-2 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-238.29A(6) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-131(A)(6) (2005); OR. REV. STAT.
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Charter schools can be closed for budgetary improprieties, civil rights
violations, and a host of other factors,42 but outcome accountability is
the guiding principle of charter schools.
3. Choice
Most state charter-authorizing statutes specifically identify
expanding choice options as a reason for creating charter schools.
4 3
Charters, as schools of choice, provide students alternatives to their
assigned schools and create market accountability. Charter schools do
not have students assigned to them from a geographic region like a
traditional school. Rather, students from across a school district, or in
some cases across the entire state, apply to the charter school. Charter
schools compete with traditional schools and other charter schools to
enroll these students. Charter proponents argue that by providing
educational options for parents, market pressure is applied to
traditional public schools (and other charter schools) to gain or lose
students and funding. 44
Because charter schools are schools of choice, they were never
intended to address every need of all the possible students.45 In fact,
charter schools are by their nature not designed to be all things to all
students. They are often permitted to have a specialized academic or
§ 338.005(8) (2007); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 17-1702-A(6) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-
40-20 (4) (2004).
42. Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes That
Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 370 (2003). See generally
Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Charter School Accountability: Legal Considerations Concerning
Nonrenewal and Revocation Procedures, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 551 (considering various
reasons for revocation of school charters).
43. See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(b)(6); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-24-2-
1(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-2; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2850(2)(e) (McKinney 2009); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29A(5) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-131(A)(4); OR. REV.
STAT. § 338.015(2); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 17-1702-A(6); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-2(c)(5);
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.001(a)(2) (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-la-503(4)
(LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-301(v) (West 2011).
44. For an in-depth discussion of the early charter and choice movement, see CUBAN,
supra note 24, at 138-44; RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, TOUGH LIBERAL: ALBERT
SHANKER AND THE BATTLES OVER SCHOOLS, UNIONS, RACE, AND DEMOCRACY 308-
18 (2007); GARY MIRON & CHRISTOPHER NELSON, WHAT'S PUBLIC ABOUT CHARTER
SCHOOLS? LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT CHOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1-4 (2002).
45. See, e.g., Julie Jargon, One for All: Charter Schools Are Perfect for Special-
Education Kids. That's the Problem, DENVER WESTWORD (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www
.westword.com/content/printVersion/216212/ ("For a student who needs a very structured,
orderly environment, this [charter school] is not a good school."); Parental Choice Doesn't
Guarantee Unlimited Access, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), June 13, 2007, at B10
("Accepting all students ought not to be the objective; educating all students should be."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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operational focus, such as a specific curriculum like Montessori or a
focused subject like math and science, catering to narrow classes of
students.
4 6
Many states allow charter schools to admit students based on
these specializations. For example, in Pennsylvania "[a] charter
school may limit admission to ... a targeted population group
composed of at-risk students, or areas of concentration of the school
such as mathematics, science, or the arts. A charter school may
establish reasonable criteria to evaluate prospective students .... ""
Charter schools are often permitted to cater exclusively to disabled
students, males, at-risk students, or minorities.4"
46. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.265(a)(2) (2010) ("The program of a charter
school may be designed to serve ... students who will benefit from a particular teaching
method or curriculum .... ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-102(1)(c) ("Different pupils
learn differently and public school programs should be designed to fit the needs of
individual pupils. ); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 89(1) ("Charter schools ... may
structure curriculum around particular areas of focus such as mathematics, science, or the
arts."); see also O'NEILL & ZIEBARTH, supra note 38, at 4-5, 7 (noting that many charter
schools employ specialized curricula); LAUREN M. RHIM & MARGARET J. MCLAUGHLIN,
CHARTER SCHOOLS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION: BALANCING DISPARATE VISIONS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION IN FIFTEEN STATES
22-23 (2000), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?
nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearchSearchValue_0=ED444297&ERICExtSearchSearchTy
pe-0=no&accno=ED444297 (noting that many charter schools employ specialized
curricula).
47. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 17-1723-A(b)(2); see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1002.33(10)(e)(2), (5) (West 2009) (allowing charter schools to limit enrollment to "at
risk" students and "[s]tudents who meet reasonable academic, artistic, or other eligibility
standards"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:9(I)(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (permitting charter
schools to limit enrollment to "pupil needs, or areas of academic focus [such as] ... at-risk
pupils, vocational education pupils, mathematics, science, the arts, history, or languages");
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2)(a) (permitting single-sex charter schools and schools designed
for at-risk students); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.06(B)(1), (D)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2009)
(permitting targeted admission for at-risk, disabled students and allowing single-gender
schools); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-9(d) (stating that a charter public school can create
"reasonable academic standards as a condition for eligibility"); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1171 (allowing charter schools specializing in performing arts to "require an applicant
to audition" in order to gain admission).
48. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 506(3)(c) (Supp. 2010) (authorizing single-sex
charter schools); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(b)(2) (explaining that charter
schools can be created "[t]o increase learning opportunities . .. for at-risk pupils"); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:3972(A), 17:3991(B) (2001) (stating that "it is the intention of the
legislature that the best interests of at-risk pupils shall be the overriding consideration in
implementing" charter schools); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.580 (LexisNexis 2008)
(permitting formation of charter schools dedicated to provide educational services
exclusively to pupils with disabilities, disciplinary problems, and who are "at risk");
Quach, supra note 13, at 68 (describing how charter schools have developed to meet the
various needs of students).
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Charter schools are fulfilling their intended role in school choice
by creating an array of specialized curricula, pedagogy, and
populations. From the choice perspective, a student will select a
school because it is a good "fit." If it is not, the student is not
compelled to attend. When schools specialize and students select
them, an attitude arises that the student must adjust to the school, not
vice-versa. Adjusting specialized schools to meet every student's
needs is not part of this culture.
The foundations of charter schools-autonomy, independence,
outcome accountability, and specialization resulting from choice-run
directly counter to the guiding principles of special education.
B. The Culture of Special Education
IDEA and Section 504, the primary statutes governing the
education of disabled students, were enacted before the
accountability, choice, and charter school movements were even
imagined. The predecessor to IDEA, the Education for All
Handicapped Childrens Act ("EAHCA"), enacted in 1975, 49 was the
first comprehensive law imposing affirmative obligations on states
and school districts regarding the education of students with
disabilities. It is a funding statute under which the federal government
covers a portion of states' costs to educate disabled children. In
exchange for promises to appropriately identify, evaluate, and
educate disabled students, the federal government provides funds to
states that the states then distribute to LEAs.5 ° Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, passed in 1973,51 is an antidiscrimination statute
that works in conjunction with IDEA." These two statutes form the
backbone of special education law. 53 They were born into a civil rights
landscape where centralized bureaucracy was valued over
49. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006)).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)-(f) (2006).
51. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
52. For a discussion of Section 504 protections and the overlap with IDEA, see
LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 85-86 (1984);
Judith Welch Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicapped Children: Three Federal
Statutes and an Evolving Jurisprudence, Part I: The Statutory Maze, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 387,
395-404 (1988).
53. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006), was
passed in 1990, but it does not impose any different obligations on schools than does
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Heubert, supra note 19, at 313-41 (explaining
the interaction of Title II of ADA and Section 504 in charter schools).
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independence, adherence to procedures was emphasized over
educational outcomes, and collective responsibility was favored over
autonomy. These qualities continue to dominate special education
law today.
1. Centralized Bureaucracy Overseeing Numerous Schools
Special education law is rooted in the traditional educational
governance model that places the school district as the primary
administrative, bureaucratic, policy-making, and legal unit. When the
EAHCA was enacted in 1975, the locus of authority for decision
making resided in a centralized administrative office overseeing
numerous schools. It was school districts, not individual schools, that
were responsible for implementing policies, overseeing programs,
making human capital decisions, controlling budgeting and financing,
and providing services to schools such as meals and transportation.14
Special education law relied on this governance framework. It
presumed the existence of a district with a bureaucracy of sufficient
size to handle burdensome procedural requirements and to capitalize
on economies of scale for service provision to disabled students.55 The
EAHCA made LEAs rather than individual schools primarily
responsible for providing education for all disabled students. 6 The
LEA is still the primary entity charged with fulfilling IDEA's
obligations toward disabled students.57
An LEA is "a public board of education or other public
authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative
control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public
elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school
district, or other political subdivision of a State."58 The definition
54. Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Waive: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84
N.C. L. REV. 857, 862-65 (2006). For a thorough discussion about the genesis of the
traditional school district model of educational governance, see JOHN L. RURY,
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLING 204-05 (2d ed. 2005); Larry Cuban, Reforming Again, Again, and Again, 19
EDUC. RESEARCHER 3, 3-13 (1990).
55. LISA SNELL, REASON PUB. POLICY INST., SPECIAL EDUCATION
ACCOUNTABILITY: STRUCTURAL REFORM TO HELP CHARTER SCHOOLS MAKE THE
GRADE 12 (2004), available at http://reason.org/files/3c2966c9e879clee0a025e2lece535d4
.pdf.
56. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142,
§ 3(b)(8), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006)).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(1) (2006).
58. Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 602(8), 84 Stat. 121,
175-76 (1970). The definition has remained relatively unchanged over three decades. See
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(A).
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presumes that the LEA controls schools in a specific geographic area,
such as a school district. States are also responsible for compliance,
but they act as more of a backstop and monitor of LEA compliance
with the law. 9
In the charter context, this means that independent charter
schools that are LEAs have sole responsibility for compliance with
IDEA. Unless state law or charter agreements say otherwise, school
districts have no responsibility to provide independent charter school
students with special education or ensure the charter school's
compliance with IDEA.6" Independent charter schools are islands
with no connection to a centralized bureaucracy or network of
schools.
When passing the EAHCA Congress explicitly recognized that
small LEAs-at the time rural districts with only a few schools-
would struggle to fulfill the Act's mandates. It categorically precluded
states from distributing funds directly to LEAs that were entitled to
less than $7,500 under the Act's funding formula.6" The only way
these small LEAs could receive funding was to file consolidated
applications with other LEAs to create programs of sufficient size to
properly comply with the Act. The EAHCA also recognized that
small LEAs that were entitled to more than a $7,500 disbursement
still might not be able to create programs of "sufficient size and scope
to effectively meet the educational needs of handicapped children."62
These LEAs were also required to establish joint eligibility with other
LEAs even though they exceeded the categorical $7,500 cut-off.63 In
short, Congress knew from the beginning that small or one-school
LEAs would not be able to fulfill the Act's mandates.
These provisions changed in the 1997 reauthorization of IDEA-
the first iteration of IDEA to account for charter schools. Congress
first removed the categorical exclusion prohibiting states from
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
60. Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. Murphy ex rel. D.W.,
448 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169-70 (D.D.C. 2006); Hyde Leadership Pub. Charter Sch. v. Clark,
424 F. Supp. 2d 58, 59 (D.D.C. 2006).
61. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 § 611(c)(4)(A)(i).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(e)(1)(A); Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
§ 614(c)(1).
63. The consolidated LEAs would form a new entity, an "intermediate educational
unit," that would oversee and be responsible for the provision of special education in the
consolidated LEAs. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 § 614(c)(2)(C).
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funding small LEAs that would receive less than $7,500.6 Congress
next permitted charter schools to exist as independent, one-school
LEAs and exempted them from the joint eligibility mandate for
LEAs without "sufficient size and scope." The 1997 reauthorization
provided that a state "may not require a charter school that is a local
educational agency to jointly establish its eligibility" unless state law
allows it.65 This small but significant change may have been a nod to
state sovereignty over education, but the message was clear. Unlike
small traditional LEAs that state special education offices were
compelled to force together, they had to leave independent charter
schools alone even though they are not "of sufficient size and scope to
effectively meet the needs of children with disabilities."66
The promised results from charter school autonomy and
independence blinded Congress to its decades-long acknowledgment
of the significant capacity and administrative barriers one-school
LEAs face in serving disabled students.67 Special education law was
changed to accommodate charter principles. This was done without
any evidence or history of independent charter schools successfully
complying with IDEA. In fact, the only government study conducted
before this change identified significant problems with charter schools
and special education.' Congressional faith in autonomy and choice,
more than reasoned analysis and evidence, led to these significant
changes in IDEA.
IDEA was also amended in 1997 to deal with charter schools that
were part of existing LEAs. These schools were not individually
responsible for fulfilling IDEA, but like traditional schools were
merely part of an LEA for special education purposes. Charter
schools that are part of an existing LEA retain autonomy over many
aspects of their school-such as hiring and budget-but must work
with the LEA for special education. The confusing roles of charters
and LEAs were addressed in the 1997 reauthorization, which
64. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, § 613(e)(2), 111 Stat. 37, 76 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1413
(2006)).
65. Id. § 613(e)(1)(B); see S. REP. No. 105-17, at 48 (1997); H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, at
302 (1997).
66. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 § 613(e)(1)(A).
67. Both the House and Senate reports regarding the 1997 reauthorization noted that
"[tihe committee expects that charter schools will be in full compliance with Part B." S.
REP. NO. 105-17, at 17; H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, at 97.
68. MARGARET J. MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, CHARTER
SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 9 (1996).
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required LEAs to serve disabled students in their charter schools and
fund their charter schools, the same as their traditional schools.
69
The last significant change in the 1997 reauthorization with
respect to charter schools was the creation of a new type of oversight
entity-the educational service agency ("ESA"). An ESA is a type of
LEA and is a regional agency "authorized by State law to develop,
manage, and provide services ... to local educational agencies; and
[is] recognized as an administrative agency for purposes of the
provision of special education. ' 70 Unlike an LEA, an ESA has no
geographic boundaries and oversees LEAs rather than schools that
are part of an LEA. In other words, Congress permitted states to
create ESAs to oversee and be responsible for cooperatives
comprised of charter schools that are independent LEAs.7' So while
the 1997 IDEA exempted independent charter schools from the long-
standing capacity requirements, it provided states an avenue to
compel independent charter schools to join together for special
education purposes and be overseen by one responsible entity, an
ESA. These provisions have remained unchanged in IDEA, but states
do not utilize the ESA governance structure exclusively for charter
schools.72
2. Equality Through Process
IDEA and Section 504 were passed during the civil rights era,
when the goal of education reform was to achieve equal access to
schools rather than equal educational outcomes. Reform efforts were
focused on educational inputs, such as funding and student/teacher
racial compositions, not educational outputs like graduation rates and
69. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 § 613(a)(5).
70. Id. § 602(4) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(5)). The ESA replaced the
prior term "intermediate educational unit" to "reflect the more contemporary
understanding of the broad and varied functions of such agencies." S. REP. No. 105-17, at
6. An ESA has the same obligations and responsibilities as an LEA. Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997 § 602(15)(b)(i); Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-102, § 4(a)(22), 89 Stat. 773, 776
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006)).
71. For a general discussion of ESAs, see Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 3.
72. States often utilize ESAs as regional centers to oversee rural or small LEAs that
are compelled under IDEA to consolidate with other LEAs to receive funding. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-270 (2009); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 37-7-301, 37-7-345 (West 2010);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 162.1180 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-26 (LexisNexis 2008).
ESAs are also utilized to oversee state run schools for preschoolers, incarcerated youth,
the deaf or the blind. E. ROBERT STEPHENS & WILLIAM G. KEANE, THE EDUCATIONAL
SERVICE AGENCY: AMERICAN EDUCATION'S INVISIBLE PARTNER xviii, 120-21, 126-27
(2005); see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1987 (2001).
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test scores. "The compliance view of accountability is deeply
entrenched in the history, theory, and practice of government
involvement in special education in the United States despite recent
efforts to 'reinvent' special education by focusing more on
educational results."73 The EAHCA meticulously identified the
"policies and procedures" states and local educational agencies had to
create and implement to be eligible for federal funding earmarked for
disabled students.74 It was "purposefully designed to be rigid in its
requirements."75 These procedures persist today and are "as detailed
and far-reaching as any set of rules to which public schools are
subject."76
The only substantive requirement of the EAHCA was that
public schools provide children a "free appropriate public education"
("FAPE").7" But the Supreme Court quickly made clear in Board of
Education v. Rowley78 that the law was about "access to public
education" and "was more to open the door of public education ...
than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside."79
The Court held that the Act placed "emphasis upon" compliance with
procedures, and that "adequate compliance with the procedures
1 73. Patrick J. Wolf & Bryan C. Hassel, Effectiveness and Accountability (Part 1): The
Compliance Model, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 53, 54,
62 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds., 2001) ("A compliance regulatory system has dominated
the oversight of special education programs since responsibility for such programs became
increasingly federalized in the 1960s."); McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 25, 30
(stating that accountability in special education has historically emphasized compliance
with procedures); Patrick J. Wolf, Sisyphean Tasks, 3 EDUC. NEXT 24, 24 (2003), available
at http://educationnext.org/sisypheantasks/ (noting that special education is premised on
"process-based accountability").
74. See generally Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 §§ 612-615
(mentioning "procedure" over 100 times). The specific "policies and procedures" that
states and LEAs must create to be eligible for funding are set forth in sections 612-614 of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Id. § 613(a)(1).
75. Charter Schools and Special E. Law: An Imperfect Union, 12 SPECIAL EDUCATOR
1, 1 (1996).
76. Heubert, supra note 19, at 302; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE
IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 7 ("The system is driven by complex regulations,
excessive paperwork and ever-increasing administrative demands ...."); Anna B. Duff,
How Special Education Policy Affects Districts, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION
FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 73, at 135, 135 (stating that special education law has
created "a massive procedural maze").
77. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 §§ 612(1), 614(a)(1)(C)(ii).
While a FAPE was required to "meet state standards," the only state educational
standards at the time were procedural in nature, for example: teaching credentials, class
size limits, and graduation requirements. Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New
Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 573 & n.52.
78. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
79. Id. at 192.
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prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what
Congress wished." 80 The Court emphasized that Congress intended to
implement procedural requirements rather than to impose a
substantive educational standard, stating "the process of providing
special education and related services to handicapped children is not
guaranteed to produce any particular outcome."81 The Court did find
that the "free appropriate public education language" mandated a
minimal substantive standard and concluded that if personalized
instruction provided "some benefit" to the student "and the other
items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a
'free and appropriate public education' as defined by the Act.
82
The EAHCA was reauthorized and renamed numerous times
into its current iteration as IDEA, but the Supreme Court and lower
courts remain steadfast in their view that the law is more about
process and procedural compliance than educational outcomes.
83
Indeed, many lower courts find that noncompliance with IDEA's
procedural aspects is sufficient to find a denial of a FAPE,
irrespective of the educational outcomes achieved by the disabled
student. 84
As education reform shifted from process and inputs to
accountability and outcomes, special education law remained virtually
static. 85 As stated by the President's Commission on Excellence in
Special Education in 2002, IDEA "places process over results, and
80. Id. at 206.
81. Id. at 192 (citing S. REP. No. 94-168, at 11 (1975)).
82. Id. at 189,214.
83. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60 (2005) ("Congress appears to
have presumed instead that, if the Act's procedural requirements are respected, parents
will prevail when they have legitimate grievances."). For a thorough discussion of the
FAPE standard, the substantive standard Congress intended, and lower courts' treatment,
see generally Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of Handicapped Act:
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349 (1990).
84. See, e.g., Babb v. Knox Cnty. Sch. Sys., 965 F.2d 104,108 (6th Cir. 1992); W.G. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Target Range Sch. Dist., 960 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992); Spielberg ex rel.
Spielberg v. Henrico Cnty. Pub. Sch., 853 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1988); Bd. of Educ. of
Cnty. of Cabell v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813, 814-15 (4th Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Franklin Cnty.
Sch. Bd., 806 F.2d 623, 628-29 (5th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d
629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home To Roost
Judicial Review of Autism Special Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y
217, 267-70 (2005) (arguing that courts in autism cases focus on process violations in order
to get around the low Rowley standard).
85. Chester E. Finn et al., Conclusions and Principles for Reform, in RETHINKING
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 73, at 335, 338 ("Special
education simply hasn't kept up [with modern accountability reforms]. It's still an access-
and-services program enveloped by a civil rights orientation."); Wolf, supra note 73, at 31.
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bureaucratic compliance above student achievement, excellence and
outcomes."86 This has been true since IDEA's predecessor was passed
in 1975 and remains true today despite changes designed to introduce
accountability into special education.
While attempts were made in the 1997 and 2004 reauthorizations
of IDEA to introduce accountability, the procedural compliance
model still reigns supreme in special education.87 Nothing in the
accountability reauthorizations of IDEA changed the FAPE
standard, or how states and LEAs would be deemed in compliance
with IDEA. Federal compliance monitoring continues to focus "more
on procedural compliance than on either the appropriateness or
effectiveness of the education being delivered."88 Indeed, "despite the
law's attempt to shift the focus away from compliance ... [states']
ratings are all based on compliance, such as meeting deadlines and
providing timely due process hearings."89 The language and structure
of IDEA simply do not allow the federal government to assess states'
compliance with outcome measures, such as disabled students'
graduation rates or performance on standardized assessments.90
86. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 7,
11 (noting that IDEA is a "culture of process compliance"); see also Frederick M. Hess &
Frederick J. Brigham, How Federal Special Education Policy Affects Schooling in Virginia,
in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 73, at 161,161-
62 (stating that special education "focuses less on education attainment and more on
procedural civil rights" and that "[ujnder the IDEA, a satisfactory program is defined as
one that adheres to due process, regardless of its results"); Wade F. Horn & Douglas
Tynan, Time To Make Special Education "Special" Again, in RETHINKING SPECIAL
EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 73, at 23, 37 (commenting that special
education "focus[es] on process(es] rather than outcome[s]"); Rhim & McLaughlin, supra
note 23, at 4-5 (explaining that special education is "highly regulated" and accountability
focuses on compliance with procedures and rules).
87. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 36
(concluding that special education law remains a "process-focused law under which states
and LEAs can fail to achieve results without consequences"); Horn & Tynan, supra note
86, at 34; Wolf & Hassel, supra note 73, at 65; see also Wolf & Hassel, supra note 73, at 69-
71 (explaining how the compliance model persisted after the 1997 amendments).
88. Hess & Brigham, supra note 86, at 171, 178-79; Wolf, supra note 73, at 24;
Christina A. Samuels, Value of IDEA Ratings Questioned, EDUC. WK., July 14, 2010, at 1
(explaining how federal compliance monitoring is not concerned with educational
outcomes).
89. Samuels, supra note 88; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN
SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 11 (claiming that state and local monitoring methods
"place too much emphasis on compliance for process rather than ... on compliance for
performance and results"); Horn & Tynan, supra note 86, at 34 (writing that the changes
to special education law did not change the procedural compliance model).
90. In order to attain funding under IDEA, states must certify to the Secretary of
Education that they have "policies and procedures" that will effectively meet the Act's
conditions. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006); see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE
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Not only is procedural compliance king, it is a burdensome and
time-consuming ruler. Special education is the most heavily regulated
area of education. 9' The "paper-work and administrative
entanglements" are "onerous."92 Special education has always been a
complex maze of procedures and paperwork that is difficult to
navigate and implement, and it continues to be that way today.93
3. Collective Action
Finally, special education law presumes that public schools must
be all things to all students.94 The LEA must accommodate a child
whether he "fits" or not. As bluntly stated by the Third Circuit, under
IDEA "schools are required to provide a comprehensive range of
services to accommodate a handicapped child's educational needs,
regardless of financial and administrative burdens, and if necessary,
to resort to residential placement." 95 This is known as the "zero-
reject" policy and is "at the core" of IDEA.96
Even though individual schools comply with this policy, the law
makes it a collective responsibility shared between schools of the
LEA. IDEA prefers that a child be educated "as close as possible to
the child's home" and "in the school that he or she would attend if
nondisabled."97 Circuit courts unanimously agree that this language
IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 12 (stating that federal law constrains changes to the
monitoring process).
91. GARY MIRON ET AL., GREAT LAKES CTR. FOR EDUC. RESEARCH & PRACTICE,
SCHOOLS WITHOUT DIVERSITY: EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS,
CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRATIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN
SCHOOL SYSTEM 16 (2010), available at http://greatlakescenter.org/docs/Policy-Briefs
/MironDiversity.pdf.
92. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 11-
14, 17-18 (noting that federal monitoring is inefficient and time consuming for states).
93. Id. at 21; Cheryl M. Lange, Lauren Morando Rhim & Eileen M. Ahearn, Special
Education in Charter Schools: The View from State Education Agencies, 21 J. SPECIAL
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 12, 12 (2008); McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 38; Wolf, supra
note 73, at 24.
94. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN,supra note 46, at 21-22.
95. Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1981); see
also Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that cost
is not a valid reason to deny a disabled student a particular program).
96. Timothy W. v. Rochester Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 960 (1st Cir. 1989); see also
Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the
EAHCA adopted the "zero reject" principle). For a general discussion of the "zero reject"
principle, see Mitchell L. Yell et al., Contemporary Legal Issues in Special Education, in
CRITICAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: ACCESS, DIVERSITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
16, 21 (Audrey McCray Sorrells et al. eds., 2004); H. Rutherford Turnbull, III et al.,
IDEA, Positive Behavioral Supports, and School Safety, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 447 (2001).
97. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3), (c) (2010).
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does not create a right for a disabled student to attend a specific
school, usually the neighborhood school where the student lives,
within an LEA.98 Districts do not have to modify particular schools to
accommodate disabled children already receiving appropriate public
education in another facility within the LEA. 99 IDEA treats schools
as practically interchangeable parts of the LEA. Districts can
concentrate resources for particular disabilities at a limited number of
schools and compel attendance at those schools because
there are a limited number of [special education teachers,
paraprofessionals, and resources]; and by allocating these
98. See White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 381 (5th Cir.
2003) ("All of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue agree that, for provision of
services to an IDEA student, a school system may designate a school other than a
neighborhood school."); see, e.g., McLaughlin ex rel. McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 672 (6th Cir, 2003) (stating that there is no right under IDEA to
attend neighborhood school); Kevin G. ex rel. Robert G. v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 130
F.3d 481, 482 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[W]hile it may be preferable for Kevin G. to attend a school
located minutes from his home, placement [where a nurse is on duty full-time] satisfies
[the IDEA]."); Hudson ex rel. Hudson v. Bloomfield Hills Pub. Sch., 108 F,3d 112, 113
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding that the IDEA does not require placement in a neighborhood
school); Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727 (10th Cir.
1996) (stating that the court has previously held that the IDEA does not give a student the
right to placement at a neighborhood school); Murray ex rel. Murray v. Montrose Cnty.
Sch. Dist. Re-lJ, 51 F.3d 921, 928-29 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating there is no presumption in
the IDEA that a child must attend his or her neighborhood school); Schuldt ex rel. Schuldt
v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 77, 937 F.2d 1357, 1361-63 (8th Cir. 1991) (reiterating
that a school may place students in non-neighborhood schools rather than require physical
modification of the neighborhood school to accommodate the child's disability); Barnett
ex rel. Barnett v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that the
school district complied with IDEA by providing deaf student with "cued speech"
program in a centralized school approximately five miles farther than neighborhood
school); Wilson ex rel. Wilson v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist. No. 6 of Pima Cnty., 735 F.2d
1178, 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that a school district may assign a child to school
thirty minutes away because a teacher certified in child's disability was assigned at that
school, rather than move the service to the neighborhood school); see also Lebron v. N.
Penn. Sch. Dist., 769 F. Supp. 2d 788, 800 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that a disabled student
does not have a right to attend a particular school); Letter from Thomas Hehir, Dir.,
Office of Special Educ. Programs (OSEP), to Anonymous (Apr. 20, 1994), in 21
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 674, 674-76 (1994) (stating that it is
permissible for a student with a disability to be transferred to a school other than the
school closest to home if the transfer school continues to be appropriate to meet the
individual needs of the student); Letter from Patricia J. Guard, Acting Dir., Office of
Special Educ. Programs, to Paul Veazey, Esq., Stockwell, Sievert, Viccellio, Clements &
Shaddock, L.L.P. (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www2.ed.govlpolicy/speced/guid/idea
/letters/2001-4/veazeyll2601place.pdf ("[I]f the public agency.., has two or more equally
appropriate locations that meet the child's special education and related services needs,
the assignment of a particular school ... may be an administrative determination,
provided that determination is consistent with the placement team's decision.").
99. Schuldt, 937 F.2d at 1361, 1363.
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limited resources to regional programs, the state is better able
to provide for its disabled children. Additionally, by placing
these educators at regional centers, those centers are better
able to provide further training for those educators and make
substitutions for absent educators.100
Special education law is founded on the notion that collective
responsibility shared by a range of schools is best for students and
educators. This directly clashes with the independence and autonomy
foundations undergirding charter schools, particular charter schools
that are LEAs.
Despite the shared responsibility, most schools adhere to the
zero reject principle and serve a full range of disabled students with
significant help from the LEA.'' The LEA provides an array of
services, personnel, and expertise to its schools and unified planning
for the system. °2 This support allows individual schools to enroll a
wide range of disabled students and adjust curriculum, pedagogy, and
services to meet their needs. This contrasts directly with the charter
choice model founded on the child choosing the school that fits best.
Special education law compels the school to adjust to the child; the
choice model compels the child to adjust to the school. Of course the
"take all comers" approach underlying special education demands a
generic, basic educational model that can be easily altered to meet the
individual needs of disabled students. 0 3
C. The Clash
The clash between the principles of charter schools and special
education is stark, and the single greatest challenge facing charter
school operators today is comingling disparate visions of special
education and the charter movement.'" The two cultures could not be
more diametrically opposed and this "set[s] up barriers to a
harmonious merger."'0 5
100. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Katherine M., 91 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 1996); see
also White, 343 F.3d at 382 (reasoning that the district's centralization policy was backed
by "sound reasons ... including: (1) ability to cover absences and scheduling difficulties;
(2) training and staff development; (3) effective use of limited resources; and (4)
educational and social advantages").
101. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
104. See RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 42 (noting the competing objectives
between charter school success and special education needs).
105. Ahearn Testimony, supra note 17, at 27 ("[F]ederal laws and regulations related to
students with disabilities ... can pose problems for charter schools that are also mandated
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The charter focus on outcomes and autonomy directly collides
with the process orientation of IDEA.106 Special education law
significantly undercuts charter school independence and autonomy on
core educational issues.107 The autonomy impulse also conflicts with
the collective responsibility underpinnings of special education. This
collective action ideal, where the IEP team selects where a student is
placed within a network of schools to achieve program efficiency,
directly conflicts with the charter ideal of respecting parental choice
of a particular school.
Finally, special education's premise that schools should be all
things for all students is contrary to the specialization culture of
school choice. In the words of state charter school directors: "[W]e
have allowed charters to focus their program and not be all things to
all people.... [C]harter [schools] and special education ... are like
'yin and yang'.... [S]pecial education is driven by the belief that all
public schools should provide access to all students. All charters can't
by state law to fulfill the mission for which they were approved when they were authorized
to operate."); Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 51. See generally Rhim & McLaughlin, supra
note 23, at 4 (stating that the IDEA has "created some unique tensions between charter
schools and the traditional educational sector").
106. See Heubert, supra note 19, at 309 (noting "conflicts between policies that protect
the rights of students with disabilities and policies that seek to maximize charter school
autonomy and innovation"); see also AHEARN ET AL, supra note 23, at 43--45 (discussing
the tension between special education and the value of autonomy and parental choice);
RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 2-3, 41 (noting that "[a] question increasingly
arising .. . is how to balance the autonomous and individualized nature of charter schools
with the highly regulated nature of special education" and that "there is a philosophical
gap between the individualized, autonomous nature of charter schools and highly
regulated special education programs"); Lange et al., supra note 93, at 13 (noting the
"conflicts between charter laws (which often reduce regulations) and disability laws
(highly regulatory in nature)"); Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 51-52, 62 ("[P]olicy tension
associated with providing regulated special education programs in deregulated charter
schools is arguably a permanent part of the charter school environment."); Lauren
Morando Rhim & Margaret J. McLaughlin, Special Education in American Charter
Schools: State Level Policy, Practices and Tension, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. EDUC. 373, 381
(2001) ("[T]here is a fundamental philosophical gap between the individualised,
autonomous nature of charter schools and highly regulated nature of special education
programmes.'); Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 4-5 (stating that "It]he highly
regulated special education practices and policies come into conflict with charter school
laws designed to maximize autonomy and flexibility within schools" and that the "policy
tension between charter schools and IDEA is the emphasis on procedural compliance
associated with special education and the principles of autonomy and regulatory flexibility
that are central to the charter school concept").
107. See Heubert, supra note 19, at 308-09, 311-12, 319, 344; see also AHEARN ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 13, 43 (discussing the tensions between highly regulated special education
and autonomous charter schools); RHIM & McLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 42 ("IT]here
is a philosophical gap between the individualized, autonomous nature of charter schools
and highly regulated special education programs.").
2012] SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CHARTER SCHOOLS 681
really be all things to all students .... 08 It creates significant tension
when charter schools have to modify their mission for disabled
students. 0 9
II. MANIFESTATIONS OF THE CULTURE CLASH
The conflicting fundamental principles result in charter schools
struggling to serve disabled students. Charter schools often do not
properly identify, assess, and enroll disabled students, particularly
severely disabled students; provide students a continuum of
alternative educational placements under the Least Restrictive
Environment obligation; or comply with the "child find"
requirements of IDEA.
A. The Under-Enrollment of Disabled Students in Charter Schools
Charter schools' largest transgression is noncompliance with the
access rights granted to disabled students under IDEA and Section
504. From the beginning of the charter movement, there were
concerns that charter schools were not educating their fair share of
disabled students. Early studies funded by the Department of
Education found that disabled students were not receiving equal
access to charter schools in violation of the law.110 National reports
continue to show that charter schools are serving a lower proportion
of disabled students than traditional schools."' Local reports from
108. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 21-22.
109. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 5.
110. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4 (summarizing a 2000 study of IDEA
noncompliance among certain charter schools); MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 9
(summarizing early research); see JACKSON, supra note 17, at 9; F. HOWARD NELSON ET
AL., FINANCING AUTONOMY: THE IMPACT OF MISSION AND SCALE ON CHARTER
SCHOOL FINANCE 41 (2003); SNELL, supra note 55, at 1; Mary Bailey Estes, Choice for
All?: Charter Schools and Students with Special Needs, 37 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 257, 258
(2004); Heubert, supra note 19, at 309-10; Joseph R. McKinney, Charter Schools: A New
Barrier for Children with Disabilities, 54 EDUC. LEADERSHIP No. 2, 22, 24-25 (1996)
[hereinafter McKinney, Charter Schools] (noting that some disabled students are denied
equal access to charter schools); McKinney, supra note 14, at 565-67; Elizabeth A.
Swanson, Special Education in Charter Schools, 69 EDUC. F. 34, 38-41 (2004); Debra
Viadero, Federal Report Examines Charter Schools, EDUC. WK., Dec. 1, 2004, at 3.
111. See, e.g., The All Students Achieving Through Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on
H.R. 4330 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 18, 19 (2010) (statement
of Thomas Hehir, Ed.D., Professor, Harvard Graduate Sch. of Educ.) [hereinafter Hehir
Testimony], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111
_house ..hearings&docid=f:54829.pdf ("[I1f you look at charters in many places, the
number of kids with disabilities who are enrolled in those charters is significantly below
what exists in traditional schools."); GARY MIRON ET AL., WHAT MAKES KIPP WORK? A
STUDY OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS, ATTRITION, AND SCHOOL FINANCE i (2011),
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Arizona, Michigan and Minnesota, 112 California," l3  Colorado, 114
Delaware, 5  the District of Columbia,'1 6 Massachusetts," 7  New
available at http://www.edweek.org/media/kippstudy.pdf ("KIPP schools enrolled a lower
percentage of students with disabilities (5.9%) than did their local school districts
(12.1%)."); MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at 7, 16-17 (discussing varying disparities
between special education populations in charter schools vis-a-vis public school
counterparts); OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, RE: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Los ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE MODIFIED CONSENT DECREE DURING THE 2009-2010 SCHOOL YEAR-PART I,
at 18 (2010), available at http://oimla.com/pdf/20100929/OIMReportl-Final.pdf ("In the
past two years, issues related to the equitable access of students with disabilities at charter
schools have emerged nationally."); CHRISTINA CLARK TUTTLE ET AL., MATHEMATICA
POLICY RESEARCH, INC., STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS AND ACHIEVEMENT IN 22 KIPP
MIDDLE SCHOOLS xii (2010), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications
/pdfs/education/KIPP fnlrpt.pdf ("On average, KIPP middle schools have ... lower
concentrations of special education and limited English proficiency ("LEP") students,
than the public schools from which they draw."); Elizabeth R. Drame, Measuring
Academic Growth in Students with Disabilities in Charter Schools, 42 EDUC. & URB.
SOC'Y 379, 381 (2010) (noting a concern that "charter schools can 'select' their students
with disabilities and therefore avoid facing the same level of challenges experienced by the
larger public school district"); Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, Choice, Integration,
and Educational Opportunity: Evidence on Competitive Incentives for Student Sorting in
Charter Schools, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 351, 356 (2009) (noting that in-depth study
indicates that "charter schools serve a lower proportion of special needs students");
McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing various attempts by charter schools to
meet special education needs, but noting that "one-size-fits-all" practices would "be likely
to restrict access to meaningful curriculum [] for students with disabilities"); Hehir, supra
note 7.
112. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 375.
113. See Cassandra Guarino & Derrick Chau, Special Education in Charter and
Conventional Public Schools, in CHARTER SCHOOL OPERATIONS AND PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM CALIFORNIA 161, 172 (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/content
/dam/rand/pubs/monograph-reports/2011/RANDMR1700.pdf.
114. Jeremy P. Meyer, Charters Challenged-DPS Wants Them To Serve More Special-
Needs Kids, DENV. POST, Oct. 26, 2009, at 1A; Jeremy P. Meyer & Burt Hubbard,
Imbalance in Special Education-Charter Schools Enroll Fewer with Needs, DENV. POST,
June 13, 2009, at 1A.
115. MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at 25.
116. See, e.g., Report of the Evaluation Team for the 2009-10 School Year at 65,
Blackman v. District of Columbia, No. 97-1629 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://
www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=3b-mFaOePCc%3D&tabid=190 (reporting on
the compliance and performance in District of Columbia schools); see also Michael
Birnbaum, Special-Ed Problems Continue in District, WASH. POST, June 27, 2009, at B1
(reporting on criticisms of D.C. public charter schools in their "selective admissions" that
"discourage special-needs students from enrolling"); Complaint Letter from Ira A.
Burnim, Legal Dir., & Lewis Bossing, Senior Att'y, Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for
Mental Health Law, to Anurima Bhargava, Chief Educ. Opportunities Section, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Civil Rights Div. 3 (May 12, 2011) [hereinafter Bazelon Center for Mental
Health Law], available at http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
ZHsqwTj8U78%3d&tabid=77 (alleging "discrimination by the District of Columbia ...
against students with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act").
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Jersey, 18 Texas, 19 Albany,1 20 Boston, 121 Buffalo, 12 2 New York City,'23
and San Diego, 124 show that charter schools serve a significantly lower
percentage of special needs children than traditional schools.
The reports from New Orleans and Los Angeles are most telling
because the former has the highest percentage of students attending
charter schools, 125 and the latter has the largest overall number of
charter schools. 126 In New Orleans, considered the proving ground for
117. See Anne E. Trotter et al., Educational Management Organizations and Charter
Schools: Serving All Students, 213 EDUC. L. REP. 935, 944 (2006); James Vaznis, Charter
Schools Lag in Serving the Neediest, Bos. GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2009, at B1; William Blackwell,
Preparing for an Era of Charter School Expansion: An Examination of Special Education
in Massachusetts' Charter Schools 31 (Mar. 5, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (presenting information at a AERA Annual
Meeting).
118. See Martin, supra note 13, at 358-59, 375 (surveying research data suggesting
disparately low special needs enrollment in New Jersey charter schools).
119. Mary Bailey Estes, Zero Reject and School Choice: Students with Disabilities in
Texas' Charter Schools, 2 LEADERSHIP & POL'Y SCHS. 213,228 (2003).
120. See Scott Waldman, A Skewed Measure of Test Success?, TIMES UNION (Albany,
N.Y.) (Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/A-skewed-measure-of-test-
success-547295.php.
121. See Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 19 ("[I1n Boston, for instance, where 20
percent of children are English language learners, there is only one charter that exceeds 4
percent in its enrollment of English language learners."); see also Vaznis, supra note 117
("[M]ore than half [of the charter schools in the Boston area] still lagged at least 6
percentage points below the school district's average of 21 percent. In urban districts
statewide, special education enrollment was 10 percent or lower at about a third of the
charter schools.").
122. See Peter Simon, Charter Schools Lag in Special-Education Enrollment, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2002, at B3.
123. See UNITED FED'N OF TEACHERS, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE FAILURE OF
NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOLS TO SERVE THE CITY'S NEEDIEST STUDENTS 2, 6
(2010), available at http://www.uft.orglfiles/attachments/uft-report-2010-01-separate-and-
unequal.pdf ("Less than 10 percent of charter pupils are categorized as special education
students versus a citywide average of more than 16 percent in the district public schools.");
see also Carl Campanile, Charter Ultimatum: Pol Seeks Quota on Special-Needs Kids, N.Y.
POST (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/charterultimatum
_bTPsw02N8VPIMxkwZ4EG3H (discussing legislative reaction to New York's charter
disparities).
124. See Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 21 (noting that "there were only three
children with mental retardation in all San Diego non-conversion charter schools
combined").
125. See SCOTT S. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, THE 2011 STATE OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 7 (2011), available at http://www.coweninstitute
.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/2011-SPENO-report.pdf (comparing the percentage of
New Orleans public school attendees with those of other major U.S. cities, such as
Washington, D.C., and Detroit).
126. L.A. Unified Leads Nation by Far in Number of Charter School Students, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2010), http://latimesbogs.latimes.comlanow/2OlO/12/la-unified-leads-
nation-by-far-in-number-of-charter-school-students.html.
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charter schools,'27 students with disabilities comprise 12.6% of the
student population in traditional schools but only 7.8% of the
population in charter schools. Eleven charter schools in New Orleans
reported that 5% or less of their students are disabled. 128 Los Angeles
Unified School District, which has been under federal court oversight
since 1996 for systemic noncompliance with special education law, has
similar disparities in disabled student enrollment. 129 The Office of the
Independent Monitor ("OIM") found that the enrollment of disabled
students in charter schools was "disproportionately low": disabled
students comprised 7.6% of the population in charter schools
compared to 11.3% in traditional public schools. 3 '
The problem of underrepresentation has become so acute that
states and districts are considering legislation requiring charter
schools to enroll the same percentage of disabled students as
traditional schools or to set minimum enrollment percentages.' In
New Orleans, for example, when it became apparent that charter
127. Walter Isaacson, The Greatest Education Lab, TIME, Sept. 17, 2007, at 47, 49
("New Orleans will be the nation's most visible test of the charter-school movement.");
Patrik Jonsson, As New Orleans Restarts Its Schools, Most Are Now Charter Schools,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0904/pOisO8-
ussc.html; Greg Toppo, In New Orleans Schools, It's Like Starting Over, USA TODAY
(June 7, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/educate/college/arts/articles/20070617.htm.
128. PAUL G. PASTOREK, LA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL
DATA PROFILE 2008-2009, at 3-4, available at http://www.doe.state.la.us/lde/uploads
/17133.pdf; see also INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, THE STATE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN
POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
37, 38 (2010), available at http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/THESTATEOF
_SCHOOLSINNEW ORLEANS.pdf (discussing the incongruity of demographics
between charter schools and traditional schools); SCOTT S. COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC.
INITIATIVES, RESEARCH UPDATE 4 (2010), available at http://www.coweninstitute.com
/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/research.update.1-10.v8.pdf (identifying demographic data
showing disabled students underserved in charter schools compared to traditional
schools); Sarah Carr, Equal Treatment for Special-Needs Students in Short Supply at New
Orleans Public Schools, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www
.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2010/02/post_75.html (showing that on average, roughly
eight percent of charter school students are "classified as special needs, while twelve
percent" are classified as such in non-charter schools).
129. See infra note 132.
130. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, PILOT STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS'
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MODIFIED CONSENT DECREE AND THE LAUSD SPECIAL
EDUCATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ii, 11-14 (2009), available at http://oimla.com
/pdf/20090605/PilotCharterSchool.pdf; see also Hehir Testimony, supra note 111 (stating
that disabled students are underrepresented in Los Angeles charter schools).
131. See, e.g., Dave Breitenstein, Disabled Student Denied, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers,
Fla.) (May 10, 2007), http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/news-press/access/1729477791.html
?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=May+10%2C+2007&author=Dave+Breitenstein&p
ub=The+News+Press&edition=&startpage=n%2Fa&desc=Disabled+student+denied;
Campanile, supra note 123.
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schools were under-enrolling disabled students, the state board
mandated that charter school enrollment must be ten percent
disabled students. 132 The mandate, however, has done little to curb
the underrepresentation of disabled students in New Orleans' charter
schools.
There are many explanations why charter schools serve a
significantly lower percentage of disabled students than traditional
schools. Charter schools argue that their teaching methods prevent
students from being identified as disabled and hasten
declassification. 133 If true, this should be hailed as a major success, but
no empirical or national studies support this conclusion.
Another reason for the underrepresentation may be that parents
do not want to enroll their disabled children at charter schools.1" This
is not troubling if parents are exercising genuine choice, but
experience indicates they are not. Parents of disabled students are not
applying to charter schools because they know that the schools cannot
provide sufficient support for their children. 35 This effective
elimination of charter schools as a viable choice for disabled students
violates the law. Special education law requires that "students with
disabilities must be provided a range of choices in programs and
activities that is comparable to that offered to students without
disabilities" and that schools cannot "deny admission to a student
with a disability solely because of that student's need for special
education or related aids and services." '136 Schools must modify their
programs and provide a range of services to accommodate each child,
not only the children that "fit."' 37 When charter schools fail in these
132. Carr, supra note 13; Sam Winston, The New Paradigm, GAMBIT WKLY. (New
Orleans, La.) (July 18,2006), http://www.bestofneworleans.con/gambit/the-new-paradigm
/Content?oid=1246081.
133. Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 21; THOMAS A. FIORE ET AL., CHARTER
SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY 41 (2000); SNELL,
supra note 55, at 1, 7-9; Trotter et al., supra note 117, at 945 (identifying charter advocate
argument that charters prevent classification in the first place); Zollers & Ramanathan,
supra note 2, at 297; see Breitenstein, supra note 131.
134. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 25 ("Parents look at the charters and see
that the district offers their severely disabled child more services." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
135. FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 40; Meyer & Hubbard, supra note 114; Simon,
supra note 122; Waldman, supra note 120; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra
note 116, at 7.
136. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, APPLYING FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS TO PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 7,17 (2000).
137. For a detailed explanation of how limiting parental choice by failing to provide
services is a violation of IDEA and Section 504, see Mark C. Weber, Special Education
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obligations, they also fail to serve as a realistic choice for disabled
students.
While genuine parental choice and successful teaching methods
may contribute to the under-enrollment of disabled students in
charter schools, the largest factor is charter schools' practice of
denying admission to disabled students or counseling parents out of
enrolling their disabled children in the school. "Counseling out"
occurs when a charter school dissuades a disabled student from
enrolling by stating that the school has insufficient services or
resources, that the child is not a good "fit" for the curriculum, or that
the public school could serve the child better. This practice clearly
violates the law.138 Early national studies funded by the Department
of Education indicated that one-quarter of charter schools counseled
disabled students out of attending, and many others required parents
to sign invalid waivers of their federal rights.139 In Massachusetts, the
state charter office actually provided its charter schools a blueprint
for how to counsel out disabled students."4
Strong evidence of charter schools counseling out disabled
students exists today.'41 In New Orleans, reports of charter schools
telling disabled students they should attend traditional public schools
because the charter schools lacked the necessary resources surfaced
in 2006 and continue unabated.142 The Southern Poverty Law Center
from the (Damp) Ground Up: Children with Disabilities in a Charter School-Dependent
Educational System, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 217,236-41 (2010).
138. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 136, at 7.
139. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4 (noting that significant counseling out was
occurring in charter schools); FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 20-21; JACKSON, supra
note 17, at 9 (explaining that the discrepancies between public schools and charter schools
concerning the prevalence of students with disabilities is due, in part, to counseling out);
see also RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 23 (identifying that half of the states in a
national study reported incidents of counseling out).
140. Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 297.
141. See Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 19; SNELL, supra note 55, at 17; Kevin G.
Welner & Kenneth R. Howe, Steering Towards Separation: The Policy and Legal
Implications of "Counseling" Special Education Students Away from Charter Schools, in
SCHOOL CHOICE AND DIVERSITY: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SAYS 93, 93-111 (Janelle T.
Scott ed., 2005); Estes, supra note 110, at 258; McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 39, 40;
Hehir, supra note 7.
142. Bos. CONSULTING GRP., THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS
33 (2007), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file15048.pdf; SCOTr S. COWEN
INST., THE STATE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN NEW ORLEANS 2008 REPORT 24 (2008),
available at http://www.coweninstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/SPENO2008.pdf;
Morse, supra note 13, at 176; Weber, supra note 137, at 219-20, 240; Sarah Carr, Charter
Schools Face Unique Challenges Educating Children with Special Needs, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans, La.) (Apr. 18,2010), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2010/04
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recently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that charter schools in
New Orleans are denying disabled students admission or are
counseling them out after it is discovered the child has a disabling
condition.143 Parents raise similar allegations in lawsuits throughout
the country, most recently in the District of Columbia.' 44 Reports of
charter schools screening or counseling out disabled students also
exist in Arizona, 145 Florida, 146 Massachusetts, 147 Michigan, 148 Texas, 1
49
Denver, 10 and Los Angeles.1
5 1
Charter schools underserve disabled students in general, but they
particularly under-enroll severely disabled students, or students with
low-incidence disabilities such as autism, traumatic brain injury, or
hearing, visual, or orthopedic impairments. 152 New Orleans and Los
Angeles are again emblematic of the larger problem. In Los Angeles,
the OIM concluded that students with severe low-incidence
disabilities (such as blind, deaf, autistic, or severely emotionally
impaired) are "disproportionately under-enrolled at charter schools,"
"significantly under-represented," and constitute 1.11% of the total
charter enrollment compared to 3.09% of the traditional school
population.'53 Similar conclusions are being drawn in New Orleans
/charterschoolsface-uniquesch.html; Carr, supra note 128; Katy Reckdahl, Parents,
Advocates Fear that New Orleans Charter Schools Have Rejected Students with Disabilities,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (June 5, 2010), http:l/www.nola.com/education
/index.ssf/2010/06/parentsadvocates fear that ne.html.
143. Complaint at 17-19, P.B. v. Pastorek, No. 2:10-cv-04049 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2010).
144. See Report of the Evaluation Team for the 2008-09 School Year at 73-74,
Blackman v. Dist. of Colum., No. 97-1629 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2009); Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, supra note 116, at 5-7. See generally United States v. Nobel Learning
Communities, Inc., No. 09-1818, 2010 WL 1047730 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2010) (alleging that
the defendant, a for-profit private school network, illegally discriminates against children
with disabilities in enrollment decisions); Breitenstein, supra note 131 (reporting that
charter schools denied admission to wheelchair-bound students).
145. McKinney, Charter Schools, supra note 110, at 24-25.
146. Breitenstein, supra note 131.
147. Trotter et al., supra note 117, at 944; Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 297.
148. Trotter et al., supra note 117, at 944.
149. Estes, supra note 119, at 230.
150. Editorial, Equal Access to Charter Schools, DENV. POST, June 16, 2009, at 10B;
Meyer, supra note 114.
151. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at 19; Nirvi Shah, The $68,000
Bus Ride, EDUC. WK. (Apr. 26, 2011), http:l/blogs.edweek.orgledweek/speced/2011/04/the
68000_school bus ride.htmlcmp=ENL-EU-NEWS2.
152. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 4; JACKSON, supra note 17, at 9; MCLAUGHLIN
ET AL.,supra note 68, at 8; RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 25; SNELL, supra note
55, at 1; Hehir, supra note 7; Blackwell, supra note 117, at 31-32.
153. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at ii, 11-14.
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and the District of Columbia." 4 This "cherry-picking" of students
with high-incidence, less expensive disabilities (such as learning
disabilities or speech/language issues) occurs throughout the
country. '55
There are strong incentives for charter schools to counsel out
students with disabilities or cherry-pick students with mild disabilities.
The most significant are cost and accountability concerns.156 Disabled
students are expensive to educate. They put a large strain on the
budgets of charter schools, particularly independent charter schools,
and can threaten their viability. 57 The easiest way for charter schools
to deliver on their promise to provide better educational outcomes
for the same amount of money is by weeding out the expensive and
difficult-to-educate students. 158 This creates powerful financial
incentives to avoid enrolling disabled students.
Market and outcome accountability provide equally compelling
reasons for charters to avoid enrolling disabled students.5 9 Disabled
students do not perform as well as general education students on
statewide assessment systems, which means it becomes harder for
charter schools to meet their academic performance goals as more
disabled students participate in assessments."6 This increases the
154. See Report of the Evaluation Team for the 2008-09 School Year, supra note 144,
at 73-75; Weber, supra note 137, at 220; Sarah Carr, Charters Still Show Disparities in
Special-Needs, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (Dec. 27, 2008), http://www.nola
.com/timespic/stories/index.ssf?/base/news-1/1230358945206980.xml&coll=l; Steve Ritea,
Left Behind? Some Accuse New Orleans' East Bank Charters Schools of Turning Away
Students with Special Needs, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (Apr. 30, 1997), http://
www.nola.com/timespic/stories/index.ssf?/base/news-3/1177911859154840.xm&coll=1;
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note 116, at 5-7.
155. See, e.g., Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 19; MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at
7, 16; Trotter et al., supra note 117, at 944; Weber, supra note 137, at 219-20; Zollers &
Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 297; Birnbaum, supra note 116; Dan Hardy, Charter Raises
Scores-Finances Raise Questions, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 28, 2008), http://articles.philly
.com/2008-12-28/news/24993154 _1students-school-year-chester-upland-school-district;
Connie Llanos, Charters Flunk in Disabled Access, DAILY NEWS L.A., Feb. 23, 2010, at
Al; Meyer & Hubbard, supra note 114; Simon, supra note 122.
156. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 53.
157. Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 22.
158. Id.; AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 27-28, 33; MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at
16; RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 23; Lubienski & Weitzel, supra note 111, at
374; Swanson, supra note 110, at 40; Trotter et al., supra note 117, at 943-44; Zollers &
Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 297 (noting charters have a profit motive to exclude disabled
students, particularly for-profit charters).
159. McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 28; Swanson, supra note 110, at 40.
160. See J. LEE ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., THE NATION'S REPORT CARD: MATHEMATICS 2007, 54 tbl.A-12, 62
tbl.A-19 (2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2007/2007494
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chance of sanction or non-renewal from the charter authorizer and
makes the schools a less attractive choice to all parents. Choice and
outcome accountability create perverse incentives for charters to
counsel out all disabled students or cherry-pick the least disabled
students. 161
Charters also avoid enrolling disabled students because they
infringe on charter school autonomy and specialized curricula.
Disabled students are accompanied into school by a slew of
regulatory burdens. Their accommodations often require adjustment
to teaching styles and curricula and are unwanted intrusions into the
educational structure of charter schools. 162 Enrolling an autistic child
who needs a structured educational setting into a non-structured
Waldorf or Montessori charter school, for example, would cause a
significant upheaval in the charter's teaching styles and methods. The
specialized nature of charter school missions adds additional
incentives to avoid this intrusion. Counseling out often occurs
because charter schools honestly believe the disabled student is a bad
fit with the school's specialized curriculum. 163 They simply do not
understand that the law requires that the school must modify its
program to accommodate the child."M The "zero reject" culture 65 of
special education conflicts with the foundations of charter programs.
The fewer disabled students a charter school enrolls, the greater
its autonomy, the lower its costs, the higher its performance on
statewide assessments, and the less bureaucratic red-tape it must deal
with. These perverse incentives to counsel out and cherry-pick
significantly contribute to the under-enrollment of disabled students,
especially severely disabled students, in charter schools.
B. The Least Restrictive Environment
When charter schools do enroll disabled students, they struggle
to comply with the least restrictive environment requirement in
.pdf; J. LEE ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. Scis., U.S. DEP'T
OF EDuC., THE NATION'S REPORT CARD: READING 2007, 53 tbl.A-8 (2007), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2007/2007496.pdf.
161. Drame, supra note 111, at 388-91; McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 44-45; see
also James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 932, 961-66 (2004) (explaining how NCLB accountability measures create incentives
to deny admission to low-performing students).
162. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 25.
163. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 27-28, 33; FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 40;
Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 53.
164. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 28; MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 9.
165. See supra Part I.B.3.
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IDEA, which requires that disabled students be educated in the least
restrictive environment ("LRE"). This means that, "[t]o the
maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are
educated with children who are not disabled; and ... removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only if ... education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily."' 66
The LRE requirement is commonly referred to as "inclusion" or
"mainstreaming," but these terms do not fully capture the obligation.
LRE also requires LEAs to provide a "continuum of alternative
placements" such as regular classes, special classes, and home
instruction and to make "provision for supplementary services (such
as resource room or itinerant instruction) to be provided in
conjunction with regular class placement."'67 While scholars disagree
whether full inclusion is the best educational method,'68 there is no
debate that exclusively employing a full mainstreaming model does
not comply with IDEA.
Charter schools struggle to fulfill the "continuum of services"
obligation. Most charter schools utilize a full inclusion placement for
their disabled students and incorrectly believe this alone fulfills their
LRE duties.'69 Charter schools often adopt a school-wide inclusion
policy for special education students-that is not tailored to their
unique needs-instead of offering a full continuum of placement
options. 170 One reason for this practice is that charter schools,
especially independent charter schools, do not have the capacity or
resources to offer anything other than a full-inclusion setting. 7' In
166. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(i), (ii) (2010).
167. 34 C.F.R. § 300.115. "LRE is designed to individually determine the most
appropriate educational setting for each student." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 39; Guarino & Chau, supra note 113, at
167 ("[I]nclusion, in and of itself, may not create optimal learning conditions.").
168. Compare Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 789, 790 (2006) (arguing against a presumption of full inclusion), with
Mark C. Weber, Response, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration
Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 174,174 (2007), http://www.pennumbra
.com/responses/10-2007/Weber.pdf (arguing in favor of full inclusion).
169. FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 41; OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note
130, at 20; SNELL, supra note 55, at 2, 9 (writing that charter schools meet the LRE
requirement by adopting an inclusive teaching approach); Estes, supra note 110, at 265;
Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 53; Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9; Swanson, supra
note 110, at 37; Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 298; Blackwell, supra note 117, at
33.
170. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 33; Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9-10.
171. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 31, 33-34; FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 23,
41 (finding that many charters use full inclusion model only because of financial or
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Los Angeles, for example, the OIM found that most charter schools
violated the LRE requirement because they offered only a resource
specialist and not a full continuum of alternative educational
placements."' The OIM concluded that charter schools do not have
the "expertise and resources" to create full service special education
programs that comply with the "continuum of services"
requirement."' Compounding the problem is the fact that few
charters use proper inclusion; they do not provide the required
supplementary aides and services for students in the general
education classroom.
174
As noted above, the failure to provide a continuum of alternative
educational placements contributes to the underrepresentation of
special needs students in charter schools. Charter schools frequently
tell parents that their services are limited to what they have available,
which is often insufficient; this effectively counsels out disabled
students. 175 Parents of disabled students will not select a charter
school if there are insufficient resources or placement options. In Los
Angeles, for example, only 8.1% of charter schools offered a special
day program as an option for disabled students, whereas 87% of
traditional schools provided this program option. 76 Lacking such
basic services for disabled students precludes charter schools from
being a viable school option for most disabled students. As stated by
the OIM, the "disproportionate availability of special education
personnel restraints); Guarino & Chau, supra note 113, at 165-66 (showing that in
California "charter schools reported serving a significantly higher percentage of students
exclusively in the general education classroom than did conventional public schools ...
[A] service delivery choice that may be related to constraints on finances or facilities");
OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at 20; Mary Bailey Estes, Charting the
Course of Special Education in Texas' Charter Schools, 26 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD.
452, 463 (2003) (explaining that studied Texas charter schools utilize full inclusion model
without offering a full continuum of alternative educational placements); Estes, supra note
110, at 265; McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 39; Morse, supra note 13, at 176 (finding
that New Orleans charter schools utilize a one-size-fits-all inclusion model); Rhim &
McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9; Report of the Evaluation Team for the 2008-09 School
Year, supra note 144, at 74-78; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note 116, at
7-8.
172. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at 19-20.
173. Id. at 20; see also Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 8 (stating that charter
schools provide related services based on availability, not child necessity, because of
limited capacity).
174. Gleason, supra note 17, at 163; Guarino & Chau, supra note 113, at 168; Weber,
supra note 137, at 228-29; Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 298-99.
175. Estes, supra note 110, at 262-63; Report of the Evaluation Team for the 2008-09
School Year, supra note 144, at 77-78; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, supra note
116, at 7-8.
176. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at iii.
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services ... may present barriers for promoting equitable access to
schools of choice." 177
C. Child Find
Finally, charter schools struggle to fulfill IDEA's child find
obligation. IDEA mandates that LEAs identify, locate, and evaluate
children suspected of having a disability. 78 Charter schools often
intentionally violate this child find obligation because they believe
they "do a good job with all students" and "testing and labeling would
not improve a student's education in any way." '179 Individualized
Education Plans ("IEPs") required under IDEA's are de-emphasized
at some charter schools, and special education programs are not
created in others because of the belief that disabled students are
being properly served, in an informal manner, without a stigmatizing
label.'l8  This contributes to the underrepresentation of disabled
students in charter schools. With a culture focused on results, and not
on adherence to procedures, it is easy to see how charter schools
develop the attitude that labeling a child is unnecessary if special
supports and an appropriate education are already being provided. 82
The practice of not evaluating and classifying children as
disabled violates IDEA-for good reasons. If a child is not evaluated
for special education, there is simply no way to know if the child is
receiving the free appropriate public education ("FAPE") mandated
by IDEA, or what services are even needed to provide an appropriate
education. In fact, by only informally serving disabled students with
support services, but not crafting the mandatory IEP, the school is
177. Id. at 20.
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2010).
179. FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 41; see also RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note
46, at 26 (noting that charter schools enroll disabled students without identifying them
because they feel small classes will be sufficient support); Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note
106, at 380-81 (same).
180. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
181. Scaggs v. N.Y. Dep't of Educ., No. 06-CV-0799, 2007 WL 1456221, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (stating the facts of a class action alleging that a New York
charter school fails to identify children with disabilities and create IEPs); Complaint, supra
note 143, at 19-21; Swanson, supra note 110, at 37-39 (stating that from 1997 to 1998, 75%
of Michigan charters offered no special education services). Charter schools in Ohio and
Los Angeles have been cited for failing to create and implement IEPs, among other
violations. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 111, at 10.
182. SNELL, supra note 55, at 1; Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 297; Hehir,
supra note 7.
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depriving the child of a FAPE, which requires that services be
provided pursuant to an IEP. 183
Child find also ensures that disabled students receive all
appropriate services and not just the services available at the school.
The eligibility evaluation components of child find is the key tool for
identifying disabled students' deficits and the support services and
special education necessary to address those needs."8 Child find
prevents schools from merely providing what is available and compels
them to create and provide adequate programs and services.
Evaluation and identification for IDEA eligibility are also critical
to parents of disabled students. A formal finding of eligibility for
special education entitles parents to "meaningful input into all
decisions affecting their child's education and the right to seek review
of any decisions they think inappropriate." '185 Parental involvement,
according the Supreme Court, is one of the key protections afforded
disabled students under IDEA and is essential to ensuring disabled
students are provided an appropriate education.186 When charter
schools provide services only informally, and refuse to evaluate and
identify students as IDEA eligible, they are effectively cutting one of
the most important factors in a child's education-the parents-out
of the equation.
II1. MINIMIZING THE CLASH
The culture clash between charter schools and special education
must be minimized to avoid continued harm to disabled students. But
should charter school principles yield to special education values? Or
183. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D).
184. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a), (d) (setting forth requirements for evaluations and IEPs);
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (noting that an IEP is the centerpiece of IDEA's
educational delivery system); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359,
368 (1985) ("The modus operandi of the Act is the [IEP].").
185. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311-12; see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368
(holding that parents help develop eligible child's educational program and assess its
effectiveness); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982) (finding
that parents and educators are primarily responsible for formulating the educational goals
and methods for eligible children). For a discussion of the critical role parents play for
formally identified students, see Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements
Under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 441, 444-45
(2004).
186. Honig, 484 U.S. at 311 ("Congress repeatedly emphasized throughout the Act the
importance and indeed the necessity of parental participation in both the development of
the IEP and any subsequent assessments of its effectiveness."); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208
("Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for parental involvement...
in the formulation of the child's individual educational program.").
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should special education law adopt the new education reforms
underpinning charter schools? Which culture should prevail-process
or outcomes, procedures or autonomy, independence or collective
action? Movement on both sides needs to occur, but until charter
schools properly enroll and serve disabled students, the special
education model should prevail.
Special education, which has remained static despite three
decades of reform dramatically reshaping general education, could
move toward outcome accountability for individual students. Instead
of requiring only procedural compliance in serving disabled
students-a foreign concept to charter schools-IDEA could instead
demand outcome accountability. Charter schools are the best place to
begin a measured transformation of special education law, fitting it
into the accountability and choice culture. But barring this dramatic
change in special education law, which is unlikely to occur, charter
schools must adapt to the special education culture. The difficulty
here is figuring out how to bend charter school principles without
breaking them. This Part considers how the three areas of law that
affect charter schools-federal law, state law, and chartering
agreements-should be modified to make special education fit more
seamlessly into charter schools.
A. Federal Law
Special education law presumes the existence of centralized
bureaucracy overseeing numerous schools to implement complex
procedures and capitalize on economies of scale. Charter schools that
are independent LEAs do not fit this model. The first step, therefore,
is to compel charter schools to link with other charter schools or
existing LEAs for the provision of special education. Before
explaining how IDEA can be modified to accomplish this goal, it is
important to understand why prohibiting charter schools from being
single-school LEAs is critical.
1. Prohibit Charters from Being Independent LEAs
Every major study conducted on charter schools, most of them
funded by the Department of Education, concludes that charter
schools that are linked with a special education infrastructure better
serve disabled students.187 The preeminent researchers in the field,
187. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 13-14, 50; JACKSON, supra note 17, at 13-15;
RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 41; Lange et al., supra note 93, at 12, 14
(summarizing research); Morse, supra note 13, at 175; Paul T. O'Neill, Richard J. Wenning
[Vol. 90
2012] SPECIAL EDUCATION IN CHARTER SCHOOLS 695
Lauren Rhim and Margaret McLaughlin, conclude that "[o]ne clear
finding from our research is that charter schools benefit from
affiliation with a special education 'infrastructure' that supports the
provision of special education and related services in individual
schools." '188 The reason is simple: linkages enable capacity building
through the sharing of resources and knowledge.18 9 Lack of money
and knowledge are the two of the most significant barriers to
independent charter schools building programs of sufficient capacity
to serve disabled students.190
Special education is costly for all schools, but the cost can be
prohibitive for charter schools that are LEAs.!9 This is because
independent charter schools cannot benefit from the economies of
scale found in large school districts.19 Single-school LEAs need to
hire a special education director for one site, while larger districts can
employ a special education director that oversees numerous sites.193
The same is true for other personnel necessary to make a viable
special education program, such as occupational, speech, and physical
therapists. 94 In a traditional school district-the one contemplated by
IDEA-a centralized bureaucracy can efficiently deploy all these
people, resources, and technology across numerous schools. Charter
schools that are LEAs cannot capitalize on these money-saving
efficiencies.195
The resource strain is so severe that a single lawsuit or a child
requiring intensive and expensive programming can bankrupt an
independent charter school. Independent charter schools are less
& Elizabeth Giovannetti, Serving Students with Disabilities in Charter Schools: Legal
Obligations and Policy Options, 169 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 7 (2002) (summarizing research).
188. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9.
189. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 15 (reporting that properly implementing
special education programs hinges on capacity); JACKSON, supra note 17, at 13 (arguing
that charters perform better when linked to an LEA because these increase capacity).
190. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 53 (stating that charter schools struggle to
create capacity to provide special education); Lange et al., supra note 93, at 12, 19;
McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 39 (stating that charters fail to properly serve special
education students because of capacity issues); Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 106, at
374 (concluding that charters that are LEAs do not have sufficient "depth and breadth of
human and fiscal resources"); Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 8.
191. Estes, supra note 110, at 258; Gleason, supra note 17, at 158; McKinney, supra
note 14, at 169.
192. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 7.
193. See Gleason, supra note 17, at 171.
194. Id.
195. MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at 16; SNELL, supra note 55, at 2, 12; Heubert, supra
note 19, at 320-21; Morse, supra note 13, at 178; O'Neill et al., supra note 187, at 3-4;
Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 7.
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likely to have a budgetary cushion for private school placements,
litigation, or expensive treatments. Indeed, special education creates
the biggest threat to charter school solvency. 196 Despite congressional
recognition that independent charter schools are "more exposed to
varying and unforeseen costs than most traditional LEAs," Congress
exempted these schools from joint eligibility requirements that would
help defray costs, spread risks, and provide more financial security. 97
Prohibiting charter schools from being single-school LEAs is the best
means to solve the economic inefficiencies that limit capacity
building.198
The lack of knowledge of special education law, practices, and
procedures also prevents independent charters from properly serving
disabled students. Charter school personnel are often ignorant of
their obligations to disabled students under complex federal laws and
are unfamiliar with special education services in general. 199 This
ignorance of special education obligations translates into poor service
for disabled students.2"
Compelling charter schools to link with an existing LEA or other
charter schools will help them build both their knowledge and
experience capacity. Charters cannot succeed unless given access to
196. Heubert, supra note 19, at 319-20; O'Neill et al., supra note 187, at 3; Weber,
supra note 137, at 244; Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 297.
197. S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 22 (2003); see also RHiM & McLAUGHLIN, supra note 46,
at 3 (stating that charters are disproportionately affected by special education costs
because they are small); Gleason, supra note 17, at 170 (noting that traditional charter
schools "are less affected by the fiscal isolation that independent LEA charter schools
face").
198. O'Neill et al., supra note 187, at 19.
199. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 28-29 ("IT]he overriding characteristic is a lack
of knowledge of IDEA and what it means to a charter school, the state department of
education, or a sponsoring or local education agency. The lack of knowledge impacts
implementation for all parties."); MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 10; RHIM &
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 10-11, 31; Heubert, supra note 19, at 322; McLaughlin &
Rhim, supra note 9, at 38 (summarizing the studies); see also Estes, supra note 171, at 463
(noting that Texas charter operators lack knowledge of special education obligations);
Estes, supra note 110, at 258 (providing an overview of personal accounts and statistics
that show discrimination against disabled students in charter schools); Lange et al., supra
note 93, at 12, 13 (noting that there is a "lack of attention to specific legal issues regarding
educating students with disabilities in charter schools"); McKinney, Charter Schools, supra
note 110, at 24-25 ("Charter schools are totally out of it when it comes to special ed."
(quoting an unnamed state official)); Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 53-54 ("A study
conducted relatively early in the evolution of the charter sector documented problems
associated with simply providing students with disabilities access to charter schools.");
Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 374, 378-79 (explaining why charter schools are
not meeting their legal obligation to educate disabled students who enroll).
200. Estes, supra note 110, at 264; Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 9-10.
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strategies for managing the procedural and administrative aspects of
special education law and mechanisms the existing system has devised
for compliance with the legal mandates. °1 Compelling charters to
partner with existing LEAs or each other provides charters with this
necessary access and will help them overcome their knowledge gap.201
While charters may reap significant advantages from autonomy
in general education,0 3 it is not beneficial for charter schools to be
independent and autonomous when it comes to providing special
education.2 °4 Independent charter schools cannot do it alone; they
require help to create sufficient capacity-in program offerings,
procedural structures, and legal knowledge. Many independent
charter schools recognize these inherent limitations and form
cooperatives to pool resources and knowledge. 205 But cooperatives
are voluntary and do not include all charter schools.2 6 More is
needed to protect disabled students than simply the hope that
charters will forego their treasured autonomy and link themselves to
large bureaucracies for special education purposes.
2. Compel Charter Schools To Link with Larger Service
Organizations
IDEA can be changed in several ways to compel charter schools
to be part of a larger collective whole. The easiest and least intrusive
step is to reinstate the pre-1997 provision in IDEA that required
small LEAs to create joint programs with other LEAs to establish
eligibility for IDEA funding. Congress could reinstate the provision
prohibiting distribution of IDEA funds to LEAs entitled to less than
$7,500 (which should be adjusted to today's dollars), unless they
201. Lange et al., supra note 93, at 12, 19; see also Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23,
at 8 (stating that charters do not meet the needs of disabled students because they lack
expertise and experience).
202. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 35.
203. It is questionable whether increased autonomy results in better learning outcomes
for any students. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-2 (finding
no relationship between achievement impacts and level of autonomy).
204. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9.
205. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 31-33; RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46,
at 37; SNELL, supra note 55, at 19-20; Jeremy P. Meyer, DPS Aims To Make Charter
Schools More Diverse, DENV. POST (Oct. 26,2009), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci
13641344.
206. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 378; see also, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 56195.1(f) (West Supp. 2011) (permitting charter schools that are LEAs to submit joint
service plans); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-603 (West 2011) (permitting, but not
requiring, charter schools to form collaboratives); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 29.007 (West
2006) (permitting charter schools to enter into joint operation agreements).
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created joint special education programs with other entities. This
small measure alone would compel independent charter schools to
join with existing LEAs or other charter schools to receive IDEA
funding.
Congress could also remove the charter school exemption from
the rule that state educational agencies can compel small LEAs to
create joint programs if they are not of "sufficient size and scope to
effectively meet the needs of children with disabilities."2 7 This
exception prohibits those most knowledgeable of charter school
capacity-state special education departments-from compelling
independent charter schools to combine forces unless state legislation
permits it.2"8 The troubled history of disabled students in charter
schools shows that this exemption is unwarranted. There is no reason
to treat charter schools differently than any other small LEA with
only one or two schools. The $7,500 minimum requirement was
removed and the special exemption for charter schools was created
because Congress had faith in charter schools to properly serve
disabled students.2 9 More than a decade of actual practice shows this
faith was misplaced.
A more dramatic and effective measure would be for Congress to
require charter schools be part of an LEA or educational service
agency ("ESA").21 ° IDEA should categorically prohibit charter
schools from being independent LEAs. Congress has not taken this
step for charter schools because it wants to allow states the flexibility
to define their charter schools' LEA status. 21' But there is no
justification for the disparate treatment of charter schools and other
small LEAs, particularly in light of their documented record of poorly
serving disabled students. For two decades, IDEA has limited the
autonomy of small school districts-by mandating that they combine
for purposes of special education-because it was recognized they
were incapable of implementing IDEA.212 This same reasoning
justifies stripping charter schools of independent LEA status.
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(e)(1)(A) (2006).
208. § 1413(e)(1)(B) (creating an exception to subpart (A) for charter schools).
209. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 48; Heubert, supra note 19, at 351;
McKinney, Charter Schools, supra note 110, at 25; O'Neill et al., supra note 187, at 18.
211. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 20, at 39.
212. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
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a. Advantages to Compelling Linkage
Prohibiting charters from being LEAs will go a long way toward
addressing charter schools' major failures under special education
law-access, LRE, and child find-by ensuring they are connected to
an organized and knowledgeable bureaucracy and network of schools
with sufficient capacity to serve disabled students. Compelling charter
schools to link with existing LEAs or ESAs addresses several of the
underlying causes of the underrepresentation of disabled students in
charter schools.
First, it reduces the financial incentives to counsel-out or cherry-
pick disabled students. With the ability to spread costs for educating
disabled students, particularly severely disabled students, across
numerous schools, the financial burden is lessened. Instead of bearing
the sole responsibility and cost alone as independent charter schools,
a network of schools with one central special education office can
efficiently allocate resources and reduce the financial incentive to
deny enrollment to disabled students. 213 It is unsurprising that an
early federal study found that charter schools that were part of LEAs
had higher prevalence rates of disabled students than independent
charter schools.214
Second, charter schools that are linked to larger special
education structures are more likely to have the capacity to offer the
full range of services for each disabled student required by IDEA.
Independent charter schools lack the resources and knowledge to
create the mandatory full continuum of alternative educational
placements.215 Economies of scale and knowledge can be attained by
compelling partnerships, which help charter schools fulfill their LRE
obligations under IDEA.216 This makes charter schools a viable
choice for parents of disabled students and should increase their
enrollment.
Finally, requiring charters to be part of an LEA or ESA will
advance their child find activities. The primary reason charter schools
fail at child find is their focus on outcomes without any understanding
of the importance of identification, assessment, and IEP creation.217
An experienced bureaucracy can train charter schools and teachers
213. Heubert, supra note 19, at 350.
214. JACKSON, supra note 17, at 9.
215. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 8.
216. Cf AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 31 ("To solve the problem of capacity,
many smaller school districts join cooperatives where they can share costs and resources
with other small school districts.").
217. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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on identification and referral obligations under IDEA. It can also
conduct assessments and IEP meetings more efficiently on a scaled
basis. A centralized assessment center combined with a consistent set
of IEP meeting personnel greatly reduces the cost of these expensive
procedures for each individual school.
Prohibiting charter schools from being independent LEAs will
help them fulfill their access, LRE, and child find obligations and will
result in two additional benefits. First, compelled linkages would
relieve states of overly burdensome monitoring responsibilities. State
education agencies ("SEAs") have the ultimate responsibility for
ensuring all LEAs in a state comply with IDEA and thus have
significant monitoring, training, and enforcement obligations.218 There
are more than 2,300 new LEAs for SEAs to monitor due exclusively
to the creation of independent charter schools.2t 9 In states that permit
charters to be LEAs, the special education offices do not have the
capacity to monitor and train each of these new LEAs. In Louisiana,
for example, the state has experienced a doubling in the number of
LEAs since Hurricane Katrina.220 This doubled the SEA's monitoring
obligation without a commensurate increase in the SEA's monitoring
capacity. As a result, the state has conducted only two cursory
monitoring visits, reviewed only ten of the fifty-nine LEAs, and is the
subject of a class action lawsuit for failing to properly monitor
LEAs. 21 Similar allegations have been raised on a lawsuit in the
District of Columbia.222 SEAs also lack capacity to provide technical
assistance to the growing number of LEAs, meaning independent
charter schools are not receiving enough state level support.23 If
charters are prohibited from attaining LEA status, SEAs can more
effectively train and monitor the reduced number of LEAs.
The second added benefit of requiring charters to be part of
LEAs or ESAs is that it creates a more consistent legal status for
218. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.100-170, 300.600 (2011).
219. PATRICK KEATON, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NUMBERS AND TYPES
OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY LOCAL EDUCATION AGENCIES FROM THE
COMMON CORE OF DATA: SCHOOL YEAR 2009-10, at 6 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/pubs20ll/2011346.pdf (reporting 17,807 operating LEAs of which 2,236 are
charter agencies).
220. EILEEN M. AHEARN, PROJECT FORUM, NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE DIRS. OF
SPECIAL EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION: A REPORT ON STATE
POLICIES 19 (1999); AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 35, 53.
221. Complaint, supra note 143, at 16-17.
222. Report of the Evaluation Team for the 2008-09 School Year, supra note 144, at
65-71.
223. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 39-40.
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charter schools across states and within states. Variability in legal
status of charter schools between states and within states poses
"unique challenges for stakeholders (e.g., policymakers, analysts, and
parents) involved with developing or navigating state charter school
policies." '224 The wide range of special education structures also makes
technical assistance and professional development from the states
difficult.225 Certainty regarding lines of authority, oversight, and
service provision is critical to successful implementation of special
education in charter schools, and this certainty is currently lacking. 6
Compelling charter schools to be linked to an LEA or ESA provides
consistency and stability.
b. The Perceived Disadvantages of Compelling Linkage
This proposal will certainly have detractors, particularly among
the charter movement, because it reduces charter school autonomy. 27
Many charter schools demand independence in providing special
education, but only because they misunderstand the onerous
obligations it entails and simply default to the autonomy mantra .
2 8
Charter schools that understand the obligations of special education
yet still desire LEA status advance both normative and practical
arguments.
Charter advocates first contend that forcing charter schools into
LEAs or ESAs will limit innovation and flexibility in providing
special education.2 29 Forcing educational partnerships, particularly
with an existing LEA, will foist the school district's special education
program on the charter schools and stymie the creation of new
curricula and educational techniques.2 0 This argument makes two
false assumptions: first, that the purpose of charter schools continues
to be innovation; and second, that charter schools are in fact devising
new and creative methods to educate disabled students.
Charter schools were conceived of as laboratories for innovation
that would develop successful new methods with traditional schools.
But as Professor Holley-Walker explains, charters are increasingly
224. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 60; see, e.g., Report of the Evaluation Team for the
2008-09 School Year, supra note 144, at 77-78.
225. Lange et al., supra note 93, at 18-20.
226. Id. at 20.
227. O'Neill et al., supra note 187, at 19 (requiring charters to link with existing LEAs
reduces their autonomy).
228. BRINSON & ROSCH, supra note 25, at 24.
229. MEAD & ROTHERHAM, supra note 32, at 7.
230. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 60; see, e.g., Report of the Evaluation Team for the
2008-09 School Year, supra note 144, at 77-78.
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serving the purpose of an accountability reform mechanism-a means
to restructure failed schools-and not an innovation function.231
When the primary purpose of charter schools was innovation,
granting them LEA status made sense because special education,
maybe more than any other type of education, would benefit greatly
from new and creative educational methods. But as charter schools
become merely a substitute governance arrangement for failing
schools, the innovation justification for LEA status evaporates.
The practical justification has also dissolved because charter
schools are simply not developing new and innovative special
education programs or techniques.232 In the field of special education,
charter schools have not proven to be hotbeds of pedagogical
innovation that are "unique, original, or cutting edge. ' 233 The primary
innovations charter schools have introduced deal with staffing (e.g.
hiring differently qualified teachers), scheduling (e.g. longer school
days), and program focus (e.g. Montessori, arts, or music-based
schools).234 Charter advocates claim they are innovating new and
unique methods of instruction, but even their examples show that
their innovations are not curricular.235 It is time to stop waiting for
autonomous charter schools to create breakthrough special education
methods at the expense of disabled students.
Charter advocates will also oppose mandatory linkage on the
grounds that charter schools cannot attain the same benefits from
collective action as traditional schools. The paradox that charter
schools may have more obligations to disabled students than
traditional schools derives from the clustering dilemma. One source
of financial strain on independent charter schools is their inability to
capitalize on the efficiencies of clustering students with similar
231. Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District
Act and New Orleans' Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 142-47, 155-57 (2007).
232. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 30; MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 10;
JACKSON, supra note 17, at 8 (noting that curriculum and instructional methods are the
same in charters as traditional schools); MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at 26; Lange et al.,
supra note 93, at 19.
233. FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 39; see also Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23,
at 3 ("[T]here has been little evidence that charter schools are particularly innovative in
terms of using new instructional technologies or 'breaking the mold' in organization or
curricula." (quoting Christopher Lubienski, Charter School Innovation in Theory and
Practice: Autonomy, R&D, and Curricular Conformity, in TAKING ACCOUNT OF
CHARTER SCHOOLS: WHAT'S HAPPENED AND WHAT'S NExT? 72, 80 (Katrina E. Bulkley
& Priscilla Wohlstetter eds., 2004))).
234. See BRINSON & ROSCH, supra note 25, at 9 (describing the "stellar student
achievement[s]" of some charter schools).
235. MEAD & ROTHERHAM, supra note 32, at 7,8.
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disabilities. Traditional school districts, acting collectively, often
group students with similar disabilities in particular schools within the
district. 236 For example, a district may concentrate the services and
personnel to educate autistic children at one school and transport all
autistic children in the district to that school. The clustering school
contains all of the autistic students in the district, but they make up
only a small percentage of the student population in the school. Not
every school in the district must have personnel, programs, and
equipment at each school to properly educate every type of disabled
student.237
Charter schools that are LEAs cannot benefit from this
efficiency. They must create programs and hire personnel to educate
every category of disability, and they do not have the capacity to do
so. 238 IDEA compels independent charter schools to accommodate
every type of disabled student, no matter the cost or effort.239 Special
education law compels LEAs, including independent charter schools,
to be all things to all children-an obligation contrary to charter
culture and more onerous than that placed on traditional individual
schools within an LEA. Creating capacity to serve every type of
disability at an individual school is not only difficult, it may be
financially impossible.
Compelling charters to join LEAs or ESAs relieves them from
this onerous burden and better permits them to retain their unique
character and curricula. A Waldorf school that relies on little
structure and is an independent LEA, for example, would have to
hire personnel and rearrange its curriculum and teaching
methodology to properly serve an autistic child. If the same school
were part of an LEA or ESA that clustered autistic students at a
236. Gleason, supra note 17, at 158.
237. Heubert, supra note 19, at 321.
238. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 8; Breitenstein, supra note 131.
239. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. While Section 504 and the ADA do
not compel covered entities to make modifications that "fundamentally alter the nature of
the service" or "impose an undue hardship on the operation of [an entity's] program," 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2010) (regulating the ADA); 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2010) (regulating
Section 504), the Office of Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education
states that in the K-12 education context these provisions do not incorporate any cost or
other limit. See Digest of Response to Zirkel Inquiry (August 23, 1993), in 20 INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 134, 134-35 (1993); see also Mark C. Weber, A New
Look at Section 504 and the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 10-
13 (explaining Section 504 obligations to disabled students in K-12 education). But see
Editorial, Parental Choice Doesn't Guarantee Unlimited Access, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
(Minn.), June 13, 2007, at B10 (holding that a charter school could deny admission to a
severely disabled student without violating Section 504).
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central location, it could retain its unique character and reduce its
expenses. The school itself could become a clustering location for
students with another disability that may best be served by the
Waldorf teaching style and curriculum.
There is concern that special education law may prevent charter
schools from realizing the efficiencies of clustering. As discussed
above, IDEA certainly does not create a barrier, but Section 504
might. Section 504 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") prohibit public schools from excluding students based on
their disabilities.24 Disabled students must be provided "a range of
choices in programs and activities that is comparable to that offered
to students without disabilities. 241
Scholars believe that these provisions may prohibit charter
schools that are part of LEAs or ESAs from utilizing clustering.242
Disabled students, it is argued, are denied a comparable school choice
to nondisabled students when a charter school denies them admission
to place them at a clustering school. This is permissible in traditional
schools because schools within a district are looked at as
interchangeable parts of a collective whole. These schools share the
same governing board, policies, procedures, textbooks, personnel
policies, school hours, and curriculum, as well as many other traits.243
But charter schools, it is urged, are not interchangeable because they
are each unique and do not share curriculum, governing boards or
policies.2an So while clustering is permissible in traditional schools
because they are interchangeable parts, Section 504 and the ADA
may prohibit the same practice in charter schools because of their
uniqueness.
This concern is unfounded for several reasons. First, it elevates
the ideal of school choice over an appropriate education for disabled
students. While choice is a foundation of modern education reform
240. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). Section 504 and Title II of the ADA contain
identical substantive standards. See, e.g., Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.
R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727-28 (10th Cir. 1996).
241. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., APPLYING FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS TO PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 17 (2000),
available at http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/charter-schools/law-regsdocs
/FederalCivilRightsLaws.pdf.
242. See, e.g., Gleason, supra note 17, at 160; Heubert, supra note 19, at 321 n.98, 332-
33, 340; O'Neill et al., supra note 187, at 12-13. New York law prohibits the forming of
cooperatives among charter schools for clustering purposes. Waldman, supra note 120.
243. Saiger, supra note 54, at 862-65.
244. Quach, supra note 13, at 68 (citation omitted) (summarizing studies showing that
charter schools "are more different than they are alike").
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and charter schools, it should not trump provision of an appropriate
education. In a perfect system every school may be able to offer
appropriate programs for every type of student, but courts recognize
that this is an unrealistic expectation and that clustering benefits the
child and the LEA.
Second, courts do not focus on the uniqueness of a school when
deciding if the denial of admission violates Section 504 or the ADA,
Each school is unique for at least its location (which is important to
parents), but courts are concerned only with whether the student is
offered access to an appropriate program elsewhere. They
consistently hold that individual schools do not need to accommodate
all students under Section 504 by creating programs and services that
cater to all types of disabilities so long as the LEA offers an
appropriate program.2 45 The emphasis on appropriate alternatives-
rather than program uniqueness-should not change simply because
charter schools are involved. Denying a disabled student access to a
unique curriculum may not be any more or less harmful than denying
a disabled student access to a unique location or unique student body,
for example, the neighbors and family members at the neighborhood
school. Charter schools that are part of an LEA or ESA, just like
traditional schools, should not be compelled to accommodate every
type of disability. In short, the concern that charter schools, which are
part of LEAs, cannot take advantage of the efficiencies of clustering
is unfounded. Compelling charter schools to be part of LEAs or
ESAs reduces the culture clash and allows charter schools to better
serve disabled students.
245. See, e.g., Urban, 89 F.3d at 728 ("[Slection 504 does not require school districts to
modify school programs in order to ensure neighborhood placements."); Schuldt ex rel.
Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 77, 937 F.2d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
the underlying premise that the neighborhood school "is the only school to which the
school district can assign Erika and still be in compliance with the law"); Barnett ex reL
Barnett v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 155 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Requiring the Board
to provide every hearing-impaired student with [an interpreter] at his base school, instead
of at mainstreamed but centralized locations ... would constitute a 'substantial
modification' of the Board's educational programs" under Section 504); B.M. ex rel. S.M.
v. Bd. of Educ. of Scott Cnty., Ky, No. 5:07-153-JMH, 2008 WL 4073855, at *8 (E.D. Ky.
2008) ("The Court is not persuaded that either the ADA [or] § 504 ... require school
districts to modify school programs in order to ensure neighborhood placements when
necessary services and a free and appropriate education are available at another site
within the district."); Eva N. v. Brock, 741 F. Supp. 626, 632 (E.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 943
F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that Section 504 does not require school to hire staff and
modify the mission of the institution as reasonable accommodations).
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B. The State Level
State law plays a major role in regulating special education and
charter schools. State law, not federal law, governs creation,
oversight, legal status, and governance of charter schools.246 States
should consider changing their laws in three significant areas to
reduce the culture clash between charter schools and special
education. First, state law should compel charter schools to be part of
an ESA for special education purposes. Second, states should remove
student enrollment from the control of charter schools and utilize a
centralized and universal enrollment system. Finally, states should
require detailed special education plans in charter applications.
1. Compel Formation of Educational Service Agencies
Federal law should be changed to prohibit charter schools from
existing as independent LEAs, but should leave to states control over
the substance and form of the mandated linkage. The two possibilities
are to require charter schools to be legally part of an existing LEA, or
school district; or to have charter schools be legally part of an
independent "district" made up entirely of charter schools, in the
form of an ESA. The first strategy ensures that charter schools are
part of a longstanding special education bureaucracy with sufficient
expertise and size to capitalize on economies of scale and the benefits
of clustering. But there are many downsides to requiring charter
schools to be part of an existing LEA.
The first is the complex layer of governance structure and
oversight inserted into charter schools if they are compelled to join an
existing LEA. For example, if a charter school is part of an LEA,
which entity hires the special education staff or is legally liable for
violations of the law? Which entity supervises the staff, conducts
evaluations, or drafts the IEPs? Which entity determines when,
where, and how many services will be provided? 47 It is difficult to
delineate clear lines of responsibility between autonomous charter
schools and the bureaucratic service provision provided by the LEA.
There is already significant confusion within states, LEAs, and
charter schools about the locus of responsibility and funding, and it
leads to poor provision of special education and expensive
246. Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 116
(2011).
247. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 15.
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litigation. 48 In Chicago, for example, the district failed to provide
adequate special education services to charter schools that were part
of the LEA.249
But the bigger problem with requiring charters to be part of an
LEA is the well-documented poor relationships between the two
entities.25 ° School boards and district administrators are at best
lukewarm about charter schools because they are direct competitors
for students and the state funding that follows them.2 51 Every child
that leaves a traditional school and enrolls in a charter school means
fewer resources for the school district and less control over pedagogy
and teacher hiring and firing. The resulting forced relationship often
results in hostility and lawsuits. 252
248. MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 9; Lange et al., supra note 93, at 13-17;
Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 6 (writing that charters that are part of LEAs have
"limited understanding of their responsibilities and how they share[] responsibility with
states and districts leaders"); Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 106, at 377; see, e.g.,
Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Smith ex rel. L.S., 561 F. Supp. 2d 74, 76 (D.D.C.
2008) (stating that defendant filed an administrative due process complaint against charter
school for alleged failure to evaluate student for special education); Hyde Leadership Pub.
Charter Sch. v. Clark, 424 F. Supp. 2d 58, 58 (D.D.C. 2006) (seeking review of
determination that charter school failed to provide specialized instruction to one of its
special education students).
249. SNELL, supra note 55, at 13.
250. AHEARN ET AL.,supra note 23, at 4; McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 38-39.
251. PETERSON, supra note 7, at 218; McLaughlin & Rhim, supra note 9, at 38 (forcing
collaboration with LEAs is difficult because they are competitors).
252. See, e.g., Catapult Learning, LLC v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, No. 4:07CV936-
DJS, 2008 WL 1349646, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (dealing with an allegation by the school
board that it was owed over $200,000 for educational services provided to a charter
school); Wilbesan Charter Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 447 F. Supp. 2d
1292, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (dealing with an allegation that the School Board of
Hillsborough County committed due process and equal protection violations in its
termination of a contract for a charter school operated by an African American);
Ridgecrest Charter Sch. v. Sierra Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 648, 653 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (dealing with a charter school suing the school district for failing to
accommodate the charter school's request for classroom and nonteaching space under
Proposition 39); Sch. Dist. of Kans. City v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(dealing with an allegation that charters with LEA status violated funding provisions of
the state constitution); Golden Door Charter Sch. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Jersey
City, 948 A.2d 716, 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (per curiam) (dealing with a
charter school allegation that the school district was responsible for paying the cost of
home instruction offered to a handicapped student enrolled in a charter school); Slippery
Rock Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., 2 A.3d 471, 471 (Pa. 2010) (per curiam)
(granting appeal on question of whether school district must fund charter school's
program for four year-old student); Chester Cmty. Charter Sch. v. Commonwealth of Pa.
Dep't of Educ., 996 A.2d 68, 72 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (alleging that the school district
did not fund a charter school the amounts required by law); Ronald H. Brown Charter
Sch. v. Harrisburg City Sch. Dist., 928 A.2d 1145, 1146 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (appealing
from a decision affirming school board's denial of the renewal of the school's charter).
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This tension is exacerbated when charter schools are part of
existing LEAs for special education purposes. 2 3 Local districts are
hostile to charter schools.254 They do not believe charter schools can
appropriately provide special education.2 15 This distrust leads many
LEAs, who are ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with
IDEA, to control the delivery of special education in its charter
schools-from staffing to pedagogy to timing. LEAs impose their
existing programs and personnel on charter schools, rather than
provide charter schools resources and "hope" their programs are
IDEA compliant.256 This often results in a mismatch between the
charter model and the district services.257 In these relationships
charter schools are chartered for everything except special education
students."8 This means that charter schools have little to no say over
the special education staff provided by the LEA or how and when
services will be provided, which exacerbates tensions between the
entities.2 9 This acts to reduce any innovation in special education that
may be occurring within charter schools. 6
LEAs also do not provide special education funding to their
charter schools in the same manner that they fund their traditional
schools. Special education funding, at the school level, is almost
entirely discretionary in most states, and districts often favor their
traditional schools.26 ' Considering the favoritism districts show
traditional schools over charter schools, it is no surprise that the
schools are often funded disparately. Charter schools and their LEAs
often litigate the equitable allocation of special education funds.262
The Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Education
253. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 35.
254. MEAD & ROTHERHAM, supra note 32, at 3.
255. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 4.
256. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 16 (noting that LEAs do not like to provide
their charter schools autonomy).
257. BRINSON & ROSCH, supra note 25, at 25.
258. SNELL, supra note 55, at 13.
259. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 32.
260. SNELL, supra note 55, at 13 (arguing that making a charter part of an LEA inhibits
innovation).
261. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 23; SNELL, supra note 55, at 12-14.
262. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 60; see, e.g., IDEA Pub. Charter Sch. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 158, 160 (D.D.C. 2005) (dealing with a charter school suing the
school district for the cost of special education evaluations); Asbury Park Bd. of Educ. v.
Hope Acad. Charter Sch., 278 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (D.N.J. 2003) (dealing with a school
district suit of charter schools and the New Jersey Department of Education regarding
funding for private placements).
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concluded that LEAs in New York often cheated their charter
schools out of special education funding.263
It is for these reasons-uncertain lines of responsibility, distrust
between charter schools and their districts, limiting innovation, and
inequitable special education funding and service provision-that in
an early national study one-third of charter schools felt that their
relationship with the LEA was a barrier to the successful provision of
special education.2 6 Congress recognized that traditional school
districts were not treating their charter schools the same as their
traditional schools when it came to special education. In 2004,
Congress clarified LEA obligations to charter schools in their control
because school districts were refusing to provide charter schools with
timely special education funding or on-site services.2 65 Congressional
reports found that relationships were between LEAs and their
charter schools when it came to special education polarizing. 266 In the
2004 reauthorization of IDEA, Congress expressly spelled out that
LEAs must treat charter schools the same as they treat the traditional
schools within their control for purposes of funding and special
education provision.267
Charter schools should not be independent, but they should not
be compelled to link with an existing LEA either. To ensure charter
schools are part of a large centralized bureaucracy and a collective of
schools, which is critical for their success, 268 states should create ESAs
exclusively for charter schools and compel charters to be part of
ESAs. ESAs would essentially be "districts" for charter schools for
the purposes of serving disabled students. They could be organized in
any number of ways, such as geographically or by charter type. For
example, all of the charter schools in Los Angeles could be part of a
centralized ESA, or ESAs based on smaller geographic regions could
be created for fewer charter schools. Alternatively, various ESAs
263. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOLS ACCESS
TO IDEA, PART B FUNDS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3 (2003), available at http://www2
.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/a09c0025.pdf.
264. FIORE ET AL.,supra note 133, at 36.
265. H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 2-3 (2003); Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, § 613(a)(5), 118 Stat. 2647, 2696 (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (a)(5) (2006)); S. REP. No. 108-185, at 2 (2003). The 2004
reauthorization also clarified that states have to distribute funds directly to charter schools
that are independent LEAs. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
of 2004 § 611(f)(1), 118 Stat. at 2671 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (f)(1) (2006)); S. REP.
NO. 108-185, at 21-22 (2003).
266. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 102.
267. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(5)(A) (2006).
268. AHEARN ETAL.,supra note 23, at 17.
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could be created based on charter type, such as an ESA for college
preparatory charter schools or Montessori charters, without regard to
geography. The form, composition, and structure of the ESA would
be determined by state law.
Significant benefits flow from this governance structure. First,
the inherent tension between LEAs and charters is eliminated.
Because the ESA is a cooperative comprised exclusively of charter
schools, there is no concern of funding and service favoritism for
traditional schools that pervades LEAs. Second, ESAs can cater to
the unique needs of charter schools when serving disabled students.
Because the ESA will serve exclusively charter schools, it will be
more attuned to providing services in a way that is compatible with
the pedagogy of the charter schools. Mandating linkages to ESAs
allows charter schools to retain more autonomy than linking to a
traditional LEA. ESA's programs will be tailored specifically for
charter schools and will likely not employ a one-size-fits-all approach
because of the uniqueness of each of their schools. Finally, ESAs
made up exclusively of charter schools can allocate resources more
effectively, such as those devoted to the start-up training necessary in
charter schools to create special education programs-an unnecessary
cost in traditional schools.
In sum, ESAs made up exclusively of charter schools remove
many of the barriers created by the inherent conflict between charter
schools and traditional schools that are both served in traditional
LEAs, yet still achieving all of the benefits of collective action.
2. Utilize Universal Enrollment Procedures
All states expressly prohibit charter schools from denying
admission to disabled students.269 This prohibition is clearly
insufficient to prevent charter schools from counseling out disabled
students or cherry-picking students with mild disabilities. While the
financial pressures can be relieved, the accountability incentives are
simply too strong to merely hope that statutory prohibitions will
prevent these illegal practices. To ensure these practices cease it is
either necessary to remove the power over admission decisions from
individual charter schools or better enforce compliance, which is
discussed below.
Nearly all states leave admission procedures up to individual
charter schools. Parents must apply to individual charter schools and
269. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 55.
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a lottery must be held if the school is oversubscribed.2 7° This practice
opens the door to individual schools massaging student enrollment
after the lottery through counseling out and cherry-picking. The OIM
in Los Angeles blamed much of the significant under-enrollment of
disabled students on charter schools controlling enrollment decisions.
It recommended a unified application process among all charter
schools.271 It concluded that district oversight of the application
process is instrumental in ensuring that charter schools are not
deterred from selecting disabled students.272 There is also growing
concern in New Orleans that leaving enrollment decisions in the
hands of individual schools is leading to counseling out and cherry-
picking. As a result, New Orleans is moving toward a centralized
enrollment system.273
An effective centralized enrollment system would still utilize a
lottery at the district level but would compel charter schools to enroll
the students who are assigned to them. Parents would still select the
charter school or schools where they want to enroll, but the lottery
and final placement would be determined by the centralized enrolling
authority. Once a disabled student makes a choice, wins the lottery,
and is assigned to a school, the student's IEP team could determine
that another school in the LEA (or hopefully ESA) is an appropriate
placement and transfer the student. This decision cannot be based on
whether the assigned school has proper resources, training, or
accommodations for the child because those are required by law. The
only legitimate reason a child may be switched to a non-assigned
school is if the LEA or ESA employs clustering at the non-assigned
school.
This process ensures two rights of disabled students in charter
schools. First, it guarantees that the decision-making authority for
placement of disabled students remains with the proper authority-
the IEP team and the parents-not the charter school.274 Second, it
270. O'NEILL & ZIEBARTH, supra note 38, at 5.
271. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at ii, 4.
272. Id. at 17-19.
273. Brentin Mock, The Problem with New Orleans's Charter Schools, DAILY BEAST
(Oct. 6, 2010, 4:00 PM), http:l/www.thedailybeast.comlnewsweekl20l0ll0/O6/new-orleans-
accused-of-failing-disabled-students.html; Andrew Vanacore, In a Remade New Orleans
School System, Frustration Lingers over Finding a Place for Every Student, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (May 9, 2011), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf
/2011/05/in_a_remade school-systemfrus.html.
274. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv), (e) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.116 (2010); Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) Staff Memorandum from Richard D. Komer, Deputy Assistant Sec'y
for Policy (July 27, 1990), in 22 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 669, 670
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treats the charter school choice the same as the neighborhood school
choice in traditional schools. IDEA provides that placement should
be "as close as possible to the child's home," and, unless the IEP
requires otherwise, "in the school that he or she would attend if
nondisabled."275 Combined, these provisions give a preference for
children to be placed in their neighborhood school-the school the
parents selected through their residential choice.276 This presumption
should apply with equal force to the charter school choice. Disabled
students' rights are best protected if a centralized admission system
places disabled students and demands that only an IEP team, utilizing
a preference for the assigned school, can change the placement.
3. Require Detailed Special Education Plans in Charter Applications
As noted above, charter schools are often ignorant of their
special education obligations.277 This is particularly true at the start-
up phase, when many charter schools do not have developed budgets,
plans, or capacity to serve disabled students.27 8 As a result, charters
build knowledge, procedures, and capacity for special education as
they go.279 They focus on disabled students only after they begin
operation.
The primary reason for this is that disabled students are an
afterthought in the charter authorization process. 280 Authorizers,
when approving new charter schools, do not expect or demand
applicants to establish their ability to serve disabled students. The
gold standard in authorization practices and standards-Principles
and Standards for Charter School Authorizing, promulgated by the
National Association of Charter School Authorizers ("NACSA")-
(1990). For a thorough discussion of legal obligations surrounding IEP placement
decisions, see Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Commentary, Are School Districts Required To
Identify Placement Locations for the Delivery of Services in Proposed IEPs?, 261 W.
EDUC. L. REP. 497,504-14 (2010).
275. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3), (c) (2010).
276. See sources cited supra note 93.
277. See sources cited supra note 190.
278. Estes, supra note 110, at 258; Swanson, supra note 110, at 39.
279. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 28; FIORE ET AL., supra note 133, at 21 (stating
that charter schools often do not even develop a special education program until their
second or third year of operation and some have no program at all); Lange et al., supra
note 93, at 20; Swanson, supra note 110, at 39; Karl Turner, Cleveland Charter School
Greater Heights Academy Abruptly Closes, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (Nov. 18, 2008, 2:30
PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/11/greater-heights-academy-shuts.html.
280. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 53; Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 10.
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does not even mention disabled students in the application process.281
Most states only require applicants to include a statement that they
will not discriminate against disabled students. 282 Only a handful
require charter applicants to submit special education plans, and even
those plans are brief and rarely contain adequate information for the
authorizer to determine if an applicant can fulfill its legal
obligations.283
This lack of pre-planning leaves many charters unable, and
unwilling, to fulfill their special education obligations. 284 The
experience in Los Angeles illustrates one way in which ignorance and
lack of preparation negatively impacts disabled students. The OIM
found that a contributing factor to the disproportional under-
enrollment of disabled students in charter schools resulted from the
fact that charter applications did not require any reference to students
with disabilities or any recruitment plan.285 Many charter schools
exemplify the maxim that discrimination against disabled students is
often the result "not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect. ' 286 Because
charter applicants are not compelled by state law to plan for or create
capacity for special education, disabled students are forgotten and fall
prey to discriminatory practices once the charter is approved.
Instead of assuming charters can appropriately create plans and
build capacity once they open their doors, state law should demand
proof that applicants can appropriately serve disabled students from
day one. States should compel charter applicants to produce detailed
plans and budgets for serving disabled students as a precondition for
authorization. Charter applications should explain how the needs of
281. NAT'L ASS'N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS (NACSA), supra note 39, at 17,
21. The Principles and Standards make one mention of disabled students in the compliance
monitoring context and another mention for online charter schools. Two states demand
that their authorizers utilize NACSA's Principles and Standards. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3981-3982 (Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (West Supp. 2011).
282. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 18-19, 25; RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note
46, at 12, 15; Lange et al., supra note 93, at 17; Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 52-55; Julie
Jargon, One for All, DENV. WESTWORD (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.westword.com/2001-
02-22/news/one-for-all.
283. Ahearn Testimony, supra note 17, at 30 (testifying that the application process of
most authorizers pays little to no attention to how charter schools will amass capacity to
serve disabled students); AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 19-20.
284. Lange et al., supra note 93, at 17 (noting that the lack of attention during
authorization means charters are not prepared to serve disabled students when they
initially open).
285. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 130, at iii, 15-16.
286. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).
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special education students will be met once the school opens.2"7 The
plan should include at least a special education budget, staffing
information, oversight details, and a plan for how a full continuum of
alternative educational placements will be provided. This
requirement ensures, at the very least, that charter applicants enter
the process with eyes wide open and are not surprised by the
tremendous burden special education imposes once they open their
schools. It prevents authorizers and charter schools from treating
disabled students as an afterthought in the authorizing process.28 At
the very least, detailed plans should be required for charter schools
that will be LEAs.
Charter applicants should also be trained on special education
policies, procedures, and laws as a precondition to receiving a
charter. 29 Building capacity and knowledge are tasks too large for
many charter applicants to undertake alone; they require significant
assistance. 29 But few states require training and technical assistance
for potential operators prior to granting charters.291 This training is
often optional, not mandatory.292 Charter applicants need help
formulating special education plans, and states should demand that
they receive it either from their authorizer or the state special
education office.
287. COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2006 SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES IN CHARTER
SCHOOLS: SURVEYING PERCEPTIONS OF CHARTER SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS AND
SPECIAL EDUCATION DIRECTORS 60 (2007), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS
/ED498195.pdf ("School founders should engage in comprehensive planning for special
education before the school opens its doors."); see also AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at
49 ("[M]ere written assurances to address special education do not necessarily translate
into charter schools having the capacity to deliver special education."); Rhim et al., supra
note 20, at 53, 61 (proposing that charter schools will be better prepared to handle legal
and operational challenges by developing detailed, written plans for handling disabled
student education).
288. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 13; Julie F. Mead, Determining Charter
Schools' Responsibilities for Children with Disabilities: A Guide Through the Legal
Labyrinth, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 305, 311 (2002); Weber, supra note 137, at 225. See generally
CHERYL M. LANGE, NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE DIRS. OF SPECIAL EDUC., CHARTER
SCHOOLS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION: A HANDBOOK (1997) (discussing various
approaches charter schools should consider in order to ensure that they are adequately
prepared to handle disabled students).
289. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 18, 39; COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 287,
at 57; ELIZABETH GIOVANNETTI, EILEEN AHEARN & CHERYL LANGE, NAT'L ASS'N OF
STATE DIRS. OF SPECIAL EDUC., CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE EDUCATION OF
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 26 (2d ed. 2001).
290. RHIM & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 46, at 32.
291. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9.
292. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 40.
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Charter schools resist state legislation demanding detailed
special education plans and training. They view these preconditions as
barriers in the authorization process that are inimical to their
autonomy. 293 But demanding a plan and training are only hurdles, not
barriers, and necessary ones at that. It is not outrageous for states to
demand that applicants prove their ability to adequately educate the
roughly ten percent of their student population that needs the most
help and arrives with the most complex legal obligations. As for
autonomy, if its price is ignorance and unpreparedness, then it is not
worth pursuing, particularly at the expense of the civil rights of
disabled students.
C. Authorizer Level
Charter authorizers, and charter agreements, are the final source
of law affecting charter schools. The autonomy-for-accountability
tradeoff underlying the charter movement only works if charter
schools are held accountable by their authorizers when they fail to
fulfill their obligations to disabled students. If charter authorizers and
monitors would close down charter schools that violate the rights of
disabled students, many of the problems identified in this Article
could be avoided. If their very existence were at stake, charter schools
would better prepare for and create capacity to serve disabled
students.
But charter schools are rarely held accountable for violations of
special education law. In fact, more than one-third of charter
authorizers do not even consider special education compliance when
renewing charter schools. 294 Even when charter schools are monitored
for compliance with disability laws, many are given passing marks
despite being found in violation.295 For example, in New Orleans the
state renewed a charter despite acknowledging that it did not meet
special education standards. These renewals were granted because
each school merely "provided assurance that all applicable laws ...
were adhered to." '296 Nationwide, very few charter schools have been
293. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 9.
294. Lange et al., supra note 93, at 17 (discussing how states disagree over whether
special education compliance is needed for renewal of charter schools); McLaughlin &
Rhim, supra note 9, at 40; see also Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 6 ("Few charter
authorizers incorporate any special education indicators in their evaluation of charter
schools for renewal." (citation omitted)).
295. Zollers & Ramanathan, supra note 2, at 303.
296. LA. BD. OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., REPORT ON CHARTER
SCHOOL RENEWAL 14-15, 19 (2010) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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closed, or not renewed, because of failure to comply with special
education obligations. 97 The accountability model collapses without
stern monitoring and penalties, which seems to have occurred in
special education.2 98
There are several reasons authorizers do not uphold their end of
the accountability bargain and close schools that violate disability
laws. The first is political. It is difficult to close down charter schools
that are not meeting their benchmarks because once they become
entrenched, strong interests, such as parents and teachers, fight for
their continued existence.299 This is the main reason only nine percent
of charter schools have been closed.3" While it is politically
unpopular to close down a school that is failing its general education
students, it is even more difficult to close down a school because it is
improperly serving its small population of disabled students."1 Failing
to punish or close down the violating schools empowers more charter
schools to ignore the rights of disabled students. These tough closure
and non-renewal decisions must be made for the protection of
disabled students and can likely be accomplished only if concrete
closure standards exist.
The second reason authorizers fail to punish charters that violate
special education law is that state law and charter agreements do not
contain specific accountability standards for disabled students. 302
Charter agreements between authorizers and charter schools rarely
include detailed responsibilities for special education administration
and programs. Instead, they typically contain only general
antidiscrimination provisions, much like charter applications.3 3 The
lack of concrete accountability standards in charter agreements
means authorizers do not have the means to assess whether students
with disabilities are accessing charter schools, receiving a free
appropriate public education, or experiencing academic success.
Monitoring is left almost exclusively up to formal parent complaints
or state monitoring visits.3°4
297. SNELL, supra note 55, at 2.
298. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 23, at 50-51.
299. CREDO STUDY, supra note 3, at 7-8, 50-51; ROBIN J. LAKE & PAUL T. HILL,
CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN PORTFOLIO
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 19-20 (2009).
300. MEAD & ROTHERHAM, supra note 32, at 6.
301. Viadero,supra note 110.
302. Lange et al., supra note 93, at 17-18; Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 57.
303. COLO. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 287, at 57; Swanson, supra note 110, at 39.
304. Rhim et al., supra note 20, at 60.
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To alleviate this problem, charter agreements should contain
specific benchmarks for disabled students, similar to those already
included for general education students.3 5 The benchmarks could be
based on educational outcomes for disabled students, but because
procedural compliance reigns in special education law, the
benchmarks should be procedural in nature. The federal government
monitors state compliance with special education law through
procedural checklists, and states similarly monitor their LEAs.
Charter authorizers should also create procedural benchmarks for
their charter schools that, if not attained, result in automatic closure.
While sporadic or singular violations of special education law should
not subject a charter school to closure, there should be some level of
violations that triggers automatic penalties.
CONCLUSION
Charter schools' failure to enroll and properly serve disabled
students threatens the students and the entire charter reform effort.
"[T]he charter school experiment will be valid only if charter schools
serve the same student populations as do traditional public
schools.""3 6 The law-driven equity movement that underlies the push
for charter schools demands that the reform create equal
opportunities for disabled students. Equality is as important as quality
for the viability of any education reform, and it is not being achieved
for disabled students in charter schools.307 Charter authorizers in
Boston and Los Angeles are already skeptical about issuing more
charters until the special needs issues are resolved in charter
schools.30 8
Charter schools' violations of disabled students' civil rights
undermine not only their viability and validity, but also that of entire
public education system. If charter schools continue to grow and
under-enroll and underserve disabled students, traditional public
305. Rhim & McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 6.
306. Heubert, supra note 19, at 344; see also RAVITCH, supra note 12, at 145 (discussing
the danger of allowing charter schools to continue expanding without requiring them to
educate disabled students on a rate par with public schools); Weber, supra note 137, at 225
("If the reform of the hour for general education is to be school choice, methods must be
found to make that reform work for everyone.")
307. Martha Minow, Lecture, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257,
258 (1999).
308. Editorial, Advice and Dissent-Challenge to Charters, Bos. GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2009,
at A10; Connie Llanos, LAUSD Charter Schools Fail To Make the Grade in Area of
Disabilities, DAILY NEWS (L.A.) (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.dailynews.com/cci14449718
?IADID; Vaznis, supra note 117.
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schools will be saddled with a disproportionate number of disabled
students, along with disproportionate expenses." 9 The true threat of
charter schools to traditional public education is not their creaming
effect-luring the best and brightest students away from public
schools-but their sedimentary effect, leaving the most difficult and
most expensive disabled students behind in public schools.
A number of changes in the law could reduce the culture clash
between charter schools and special education. More empirical
research could advance these changes in the law.31° The Department
of Education has not funded any national studies on special education
in charter schools since 2002.311 Additionally, even though early
studies uncovered numerous problems, most states and the federal
government never acted on these findings by altering special
education law, charter school laws, or charter agreements. While
more research on these issues would be helpful, changes to federal,
state, and charter agreements should be made immediately to ensure
the civil rights of disabled students are protected. Charter schools are
an integral and growing part of the education reform movement, but
they will struggle to appropriately serve disabled students until
changes are made in the law that reduce the direct and profound clash
between charter culture and special education culture.
309. Hehir Testimony, supra note 111, at 18.
310. Id. (discussing how research studies on charter schools and disabled student
education show varying results).
311. MIRON ET AL., supra note 91, at 7; see Ahearn Testimony, supra note 17, at 29
(noting that no full study of counseling out phenomenon has occurred).
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